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ABSTRACT

This Article explores the background and reasons for the uncertain
professional status of compliance. After identifying the nature and origin of
compliance, it explains that there is now an accepted model of compliance
activities. It then elaborateson the key features of an occupation that scholars
identify as having achievedprofessionalstatus and explains the ways in which
compliance has progressedto achieving them. It discusses how thisfield does
not possess all the features of a profession, particularly the state
government-approvedlicensing that provides control over their occupation by
practitioners. The Article then offers several reasons for this incomplete
professionalstatus, with the most significantbeing the ambiguous relationship
between compliance and the established legal profession and the federal
government'spreferencefor compliance officers not to be members of a strong
profession. It observes how, from time to time, legal authoritiesand lawyers
assertcontrol over compliance as if it were in their domain of influence, but at
other times they have been passive or complacent with respect to compliance
practitioners. It explains how the federal government through regulatorsand

enforcement officials benefits from compliance officer's weak professional
status by using them as their "eyes and ears" in organizations. The Article then
argues that the outcome of compliance's professional journey matters for
organizationalconduct, contending that having a strong professional identity
would give compliance officers the independenceand authority in organizations
that would enable them to guide and advise organizationalactors on how to
conduct their activities in accordancewith law, regulation, and ethics. It offers
recommendations as to the future of compliance as a profession, both from an
ideal and practical perspective. It observes that compliance might ideally
become an independentprofession by being groundedin organizationalstudies.
However, it explains that the legal profession will likely continue to exercise its
authority over compliance, which means that the compliance field risks

* Gerald Baylin Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. The author thanks Miriam Baer,
Jennifer Pacella, and Stephen Park for comments on an earlier draft of this Article. This Article
drew inspiration from an earlier, shorter work entitled James A. Fanto, The Uncertain Professional
Status of Compliance, in FINANCIAL COMPLIANCE: ISSUES, CONCERNS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
67-88 (Maria Krambia-Kapardis ed., 2019). Research support came from summer stipends granted
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remaining a subdiscipline of that profession with negative professional
consequencesfor compliance officers. The Article concludes by recommending
that compliance officers who are lawyers should become a recognized part of
the legal profession, but it acknowledges that this professionaloutcome awaits
developments in the compliance field and pressurefrom compliance officers
themselves demandingprofessionalstatus.
INTRODUCTION

For the past three decades, the story of compliance has been one of
progress as it has become recognized and accepted as an important internal
control activity in business firms and other organizations. Compliance is the
organizational function which ensures that those working in and on behalf of
the organization, and thus the organization itself, are following laws,
regulations, and internal rules.1 Compliance is thus part of an organization's
internal, as opposed to external, control because it is helping enforce internally
the legal obligations imposed on organizational activities by the government,
broadly defined to include federal, state, and local government authorities.2
Until relatively recently, compliance was not generally a stand-alone firm
function, but was engaged in by those, like inside counsel, who had other
organizational roles. 3 Because, over time, the number of laws and regulations
applicable to organizations and their employees and agents has grown, as has
the risk of organizational liability for legal violations, organizations have had to
enhance their compliance function. In some domains, Congress or regulators
have required organizations to have a chief compliance officer or "CCO" who
implements a compliance program for the organization that involves a defined
set of activities and practices in which compliance officers engage. 4 It is thus
understandable that compliance has become a separate and established function
in organizations, particularly large ones, where compliance officers often work
in their own department.5
Thus, from being hidden away in the "back office" of organizations or
being identified by their other tasks, those engaged in compliance now have a
recognized title-compliance officer-and are visible in directing others on
how to do their organizational activities in compliance with law and regulation
and are consulted on an organization's practices and decisions. 6 The CCO is

1.

See GEOFFREY P. MILLER, THE LAW OF GOVERNANCE,

RISK MANAGEMENT, AND

COMPLIANCE 157 (2d ed. 2016).
2. See id. at 157-58.
3. See infra text accompanying notes 174-76.
4. See infra text accompanying notes 46-50.
5.

See,

e.g.,

Global

Compliance,

GOLDMAN

SACHS,

https://www.goldmansachs.com/careers/divisions/global-compliance/index.html
(last visited Dec.
10, 2020) (describing compliance at this investment bank as being within the Global Compliance
Division).
6. See infra text accompanying notes 65-89.
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often a key member of the chief executive officer's senior executive team, meets
regularly with the organization's board of directors, and provides advice on all
major strategies and decisions.7 Indeed, court decisions, laws and regulations,
and regulatory guidelines have made it clear to boards of directors of all
organizations that, as part of their duty to oversee their organization, they have
to make sure that it has effective compliance, which generally includes having
a CCO in charge of the compliance function.
As a result of the increased prominence and status of a compliance officer,
those taking the position, including many lawyers, no longer fear that
compliance is a career "dead end." Rather, partners at major law firms accept
CCO positions in major organizations, and compliance officers progress up the
hierarchy in their organization or are recruited to other organizations, with
enhanced responsibilities and compensation. 9 Universities and law schools
have responded to the perceived growth in the importance of compliance by
offering programs to their students to prepare them for this organizational
activity and to assist them in being hired as compliance officers.10 Those
working in the compliance field recognize that they are engaged in a special
activity and have formed organizations of compliance practitioners to share
their specialized knowledge and practices." This knowledge has become
increasingly formalized and theorized,12 and compliance is now receiving
considerable attention from scholars in a range of fields from law to
organizational studies.13
To those who study the history and development of occupations, the above
story of compliance has the sound of one that is achieving professional status.

7.

See Deborah A. DeMott, The Crucialbut (Potentially) Precarious Position of the Chief

Compliance Officer, 8 BROOK. J. CORP., FIN. & COM. L. 56, 64 (2013) (describing this role of

providing compliance advice to an organization's major actors).
8. See infra text accompanying notes 98-102.
9.

On CCO compensation, see BARKERGILMORE, 2019 COMPLIANCE COMPENSATION

REPORT 15 (2019) (noting that in large firms the total compensation of the CCO is in the

neighborhood of $500,000).
10. See generally James A. Fanto, Preparing to Become a Compliance Officer, and the
Academy, in MODERN COMPLIANCE: BEST PRACTICES FOR SECURITIES & FINANCE 755, 760-63

(David H. Lui & John H. Walsh, eds., 2015) (discussing this trend). See also infra text
accompanying notes 153-55.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 158-60.
12.

See,

e.g.,

INT'L

ORG.

FOR

STANDARDIZATION,

COMPLIANCE MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS-GUIDELINES,

INTERNATIONAL

STANDARD:

ISO 19600 (2014) (a code of compliance

management from an international organization for standardization of knowledge and practice).
13. The academic work on compliance is large and growing and will be cited from time to
time in this Article. Representative works include Sean J. Griffith, CorporateGovernance in an Era
of Compliance, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2075, 2082-83 (2016); Ann E. Tenbrunsel et al., Building
Houses on Rocks: The Role of the Ethical Infrastructure in Organizations, 16 SOC. JUST. RSCH.
285, 293-96 (2003). See infra text accompanying note 154 for a reference to the creation of
theoretical knowledge about compliance.
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As will be discussed in greater detail below," an occupation can be said to
achieve the status of a profession when its practitioners reach a number of
milestones. 15 Conscious of performing a unique activity, they are empowered
to define its nature and difference from other practices and to control who is
allowed to engage in it.16 Education and training for those who aspire to do the
activity, which are overseen by practitioners, take place in universities or
specialized schools associated with them." Knowledge about the activity is
created, theorized, and codified, again at the direction of practitioners generally
working together and conscious of being engaged in a common endeavor. 18
Certainly, compliance appears to be following the standard trajectory of a
profession. As referred to above and as will be discussed more below, 19
compliance has emerged as a distinct internal control activity in organizations.
Its practitioners, who are often grouped together in a particular organization, are
aware that they engage in a distinct practice with a defined set of activities. 20
They develop and share their knowledge among each other, including in their
own organizations, and engage in projects to theorize and codify it.2 1 They have
supported the growth of compliance training programs in universities and in
business and law schools. 22
Yet this professional ascendancy of compliance remains incomplete in a
critical respect: compliance practitioners have not received from state
governments the licensing monopoly of their occupation that is the hallmark of
established professions in the United States. 23 While the government in general
has been supportive of their activities-indeed the federal government has
required organizations in certain domains to have a compliance function-it has
not given them control of their field, typically evidenced by a state license, and
its recognition that theirs is an activity requiring this special status because its
practitioners act for the public interest.24 Without this support and recognition,
compliance officers, at least in the United States, find that, despite their
advances, they have a weakened organizational status in comparison to
recognized professionals who work in organizations. They also find that they
14.

See infra Section I.A.

15.

See generally ELIOT FREIDSON, PROFESSIONALISM: THE THIRD LOGIC 127 (2001)

(describing the milestones as specialized work grounded in theoretically based knowledge and skill,
control over that work, protection in the labor markets arising from qualifications, formal training
associated with higher education, and an ideological focus on doing good rather than just economic
gain and efficiency).
16. See infra text accompanying notes 114-16.
17. See infra text accompanying notes 117-20.
18. See infra text accompanying notes 121-23.
19. See infra Section IIIB.
20. See infra text accompanying notes 158-60.
21. See infra text accompanying note 160.
22. See infra text accompanying notes 153-54.
23. See infra text accompanying notes 124-28.
24. See infra text accompanying notes 164-67.
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risk incurring a liability for organizational actions that would typically not be
assessed against a professional advising an organization.25
This Article explores the reasons for the incomplete professional status of
compliance. It argues that the most significant reason is that the legal
profession, out of which compliance emerged, has been ambivalent towards
compliance: at times, it claims that compliance is a legal activity over which
legal authorities should assert control because it is related to legal practice or is
a subfield under the professional authority of the law. 26 At other times, legal
practitioners appear indifferent to compliance practice and turn a blind eye to
lawyers practicing as compliance officers. 27 Another significant, related reason
for the uncertain professional status of compliance is that the government,
whether state or federal, has not tried to resolve this ambivalent relationship of
compliance with the legal profession. 28 Indeed, while federal government
officials have supported the distinction between compliance practitioners and
lawyers, they have not done this to promote compliance as a stand-alone
profession, but to maintain their own control over and use of compliance
practitioners as their internal representatives in organizations. 29 In other words,
without full professional status compliance practitioners cannot use an
independent professional judgment to resist requests from government officials
for them to serve specific regulatory or enforcement purposes in their
organization.
The final reasons for compliance's professional situation that the Article
explores are that its professionalization, with the above pressures from the legal
profession and the government, is occurring at a time when those in other
disciplines than the law are asserting that their discipline should be the
intellectual foundation for compliance and when technological developments
are transforming the very nature of compliance.
Managerial scholars,
particularly those outside the United States, contest the legal orientation of
compliance and argue that compliance would be more effective if it had other
intellectual foundations. 30 Moreover, technology is being used both to help
compliance officers do their customary tasks and, sometimes, to replace them
in a given activity. 31 Regulators who have in many cases required organizations
to have a compliance function now expect organizations to make use of
technology in their compliance, technology known as regulation technology or

25.

See, e.g., Court E. Golumbic, "The Big Chill": Personal Liability and the Targetingof

FinancialSector Compliance Officers, 69 HASTINGS L.J. 45, 49 (2017) (discussing compliance

officer liability in financial firms).
26. See infra text accompanying
27. See infra text accompanying
28. See infra text accompanying
29. See infra text accompanying
30. See infra text accompanying
31. See infra text accompanying

notes
notes
notes
notes
notes
notes

178-85.
186-92.
203-06.
207-13.
217-21.
232-36.
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"Regtech."32 In other words, compliance is coming of professional age right at
a time when technology is disrupting and transforming its practice, including
by giving organizations a reason to reduce the number of compliance officers
by automating compliance.
The Article contends that the outcome of compliance's professional
journey matters because compliance officers will be more effective if they are
recognized professionals, ratherthan assistants to the legal department, deputies
of a federal government agency, or technocrats of some kind. In the complex
legal and ethical environment in which organizations function today, employees
and other organizational actors need a compliance officer within the
organization who understands well the organization's business and affairs and
the applicable legal and other obligations, and who can thus guide them in
meeting these obligations. The officer must have the independence within the
organization and outside it to be able to provide guidance and advice that
balances organizational and governmental interests. That independence and
distance from other interests can best be offered by a professional. Being a
professional would also help the compliance officer resist the organizational
and federal governmental pressure to be no more than an administrator of
compliance technology.
This Article proceeds as follows.
Part I describes the progress of
compliance as an accepted and necessary internal control function within U.S.
organizations. After identifying the nature of compliance, it briefly discusses
its origin "stories" in regulation governing different industries and in criminal
law. It then explains that there is now an accepted model of compliance
activities. The Part also discusses the place of compliance in organizations and
the importance of the position of the CCO, who oversees compliance in the
organization, directs the compliance department, and advises senior executives
and the board of directors on compliance. In addition, it examines the overall
significance of compliance governance, which is the structure of compliance
decision-making.
Part II discusses how compliance has progressed along the path to
achieving professional status. The Part first briefly reviews the literature on
professions to identify the key features of an occupation that scholars identify
as having achieved professional status. These generally are (i) engaging in a
distinct set of activities requiring the exercise of judgment and discretion, (ii)
having training for the profession that is in institutions of higher learning but
that is controlled by the profession, (iii) having practitioners with a shared sense
of engaging in a common occupation who have established organizations for
the sharing of knowledge and practices, and (iv) receiving from state
governments exclusive control over the professional activities in the form of
licensing requirements. It then examines how compliance imperfectly comports
with this professional model. It explains that compliance has become a
recognized occupation, with knowledge and skills that its practitioners must

32.

See infra text accompanying note 237.
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obtain and exhibit, but some of the knowledge and skills are closely connected
to the legal profession. Moreover, it observes that, as in the case of other
professions, institutions of higher learning increasingly impart this knowledge
and basic skills to aspiring compliance officers through courses of study, but
that this training is not the exclusive path to compliance and that it even occurs
in law schools. It discusses how compliance practitioners have a group identity
of engaging in a common mission that is exemplified by their membership in
professional organizations and by their engaging in projects of sharing their
knowledge and practices. The Part explains, however, that compliance clearly
does not possess the defining feature of professional status, which is the
practitioners' control over the field (i.e., a monopoly of practice), which state
governments grant to professions through mandating a license for professional
practice (with professionals controlling access to the license), as exemplified
most prominently by medicine and the law.
Part III explores in more detail the reasons for the incomplete professional
status of compliance. It argues that the most significant reason is the ambivalent
relationship between compliance and the established legal profession. It
explains that because, in its origins, compliance was part of or under the
authority of legal departments, from time to time, legal authorities and
practitioners have asserted control over the practice of compliance as if it were
clearly in their domain of influence. It points out, however, that at other times
the legal profession has been passive or complacent with respect to the oversight
of compliance practitioners, particularly those trained as lawyers, and has even
allowed them to engage in clearly legally-related activities. The Part offers
reasons for this ambivalence, including that the legal profession has acceded to
the wishes of organizations that need compliance but that desire to have
considerable control over it. The Part then discusses in more detail how the
federal government through regulators and enforcement officials favors the
ambiguous relationship between compliance and the legal profession and
compliance's weaker professional status because these government officials can
more easily enlist compliance officers to serve their purposes. In other words,
federal government officials exploit the professional uncertainty of compliance
to make compliance officers their "eyes and ears" in an organization.
The Part next examines two other reasons for the uncertain professional
status of compliance, the pressure from scholars in other disciplines to pull
compliance within their discipline's domain, and the influence of technology in
compliance. As noted above, organizational and management studies challenge
the legal orientation of compliance and claim that it should be under their
theoretical inspiration to enhance its effectiveness. The Part discusses the bases
for their contention, particularly that effective compliance is grounded in
organizational ethics and culture that these disciplines study, and the fact that
this orientation has support from compliance practitioners. The Part concludes
by considering the disruptive influence of technology on compliance, which is
coming of professional age right when technology is transforming its activities.
Compliance officers use technology to assist them in their tasks; organizations
want this use to save on compliance costs; and federal regulators desire it
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because it may provide them with more access to information inside
organizations. The Part discusses how technology puts the role of compliance
at play as it automates and eliminates compliance tasks, leaving uncertainty as
to what the compliance officer will do.
Part IV first argues that the outcome of compliance's professional journey
matters for organizational conduct. It contends that having a strong professional
identity will give compliance officers the independence and authority in
organizations that would enable them to guide and advise organizational actors
on how to conduct their activities in accordance with law, regulation, and ethics.
It argues that this function of guidance and advice is critical in compliance
because it represents compliance officers being brought in as trusted partners
when organizational actors are considering courses of action. It explains how
compliance practitioners might best draw their authority and status by being
members of a stand-alone profession, rather than a subfield operating under the
legal profession. It further discusses how the compliance profession could
ideally be an entirely separate field with inspiration from organizational studies,
which better reflects its broad mandate to help organizational actors comply
with the law and other organizational standards and to promote the
organization's ethical culture.
The Part concludes by explaining why the legal profession will likely
continue to exert its authority over compliance and why, as a result, the
compliance field risks remaining without professional status or, as appears to
be happening, becoming a sub-profession under the legal profession's ultimate
authority. It argues that, given the legal profession's continuing authority over
compliance and the need for and benefits of compliance's professionalization,
the legal profession should formally recognize compliance as a kind of legal
practice when it is engaged in by members of the bar. It explains how this
recognition would formally bring lawyers working as compliance officers
inside the legal profession and how this professional identification would shore
up the independence of these officers both with respect to federal government
officials and inside their organization. It explores how this professionalism
alternative for compliance might work but acknowledges that it must await
developments in compliance and pressure from compliance officers who
themselves demand professional status.
I. THE TRIUMPH OF COMPLIANCE IN ORGANIZATIONS
The last two decades have witnessed the establishment of compliance in
organizations throughout the United States. This Part provides an overview of
compliance as an internal control function in organizations, its origin in law and
regulation, and its basic features.
A. The Nature of Compliance
Compliance is the function in an organization that helps to ensure that the
organization, its employees, and its agents conduct their affairs in accordance
with law, regulation, ethical standards, and any other external or internal rules
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or standards that the organization wishes its employees and agents to follow. 33
It is thus an internal control function in an organization, which means that its
purpose is for the organization to control the conduct of employees and agents.3 4
Today, the federal government, through regulators and enforcement officials,
supplements its own enforcement of laws and regulations, which constitutes
"external control," with the "internal control" conducted by the organizations
themselves. 35 This internal control is necessary because government officials
do not have the resources to make sure that the many private organizations and
their employees are in fact complying with their legal obligations. Moreover,
having organizations themselves responsible for compliance makes for more
efficient and less intrusive control of their employees and agents, particularly in
large organizations, because organizations know their own operations and
affairs better than a regulator or prosecutor and can thus guide employees on
fulfilling their legal obligations. 36 Efficiencies also arise from the fact that an
organization has a specialized function devoted to keeping track of the legal
obligations imposed on it and its employees and agents, instead of having each
part of the organization figure them out for itself.37
Compliance is one of several internal control functions in an organization
and thus part of an organization's overall internal control. Under the standard
model, there are three levels of organizational activity implicating internal
control: (i) its business or operations, (ii) internal control functions, and (iii) a
"check" or audit of the functioning of the preceding two, which is known as
internal audit.38 In addition to compliance, the second category includes any
organizational function that supports the organization's business or operations
in achieving control objectives. 39 It would thus sweep in firm functions such as
human resources, legal, finance, and risk management that help the business or
operations personnel conduct their activities within the necessary controls."
Indeed, in current thinking and practice on internal control, risk management is

33.

See MILLER, supra note 1, at 157.

34.

See COMM. OF SPONSORING ORGS. OF THE TREADWAY COMM'N, INTERNAL CONTROL

- INTEGRATED FRAMEWORK: FRAMEWORK AND APPENDICES 2 (2013).

35. See MILLER, supra note 1, at 157-60 (explaining internal control and its history in the
United States).
36.

See Miriam Hechler Baer, Governing CorporateCompliance, 50 B.C. L. REV. 949, 959

(2009) (discussing this efficiency).
37.

See Geoffrey P. Miller, An Economic Analysis of Effective Compliance Programs, in

RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON CORPORATE CRIME AND FINANCIAL MISDEALING 247, 247-48 nn.4-5

(Jennifer Arlen ed., 2018).
38.

See COMM. OF SPONSORING ORGS. OF THE TREADWAY COMM'N, supra note 34, at 45,

147 (identifying the three lines of defense as (i) management and other front-line personnel, (ii)
"business-enabling" internal-control functions, and (iii) internal auditors).
39.

See id.

40.

See id. at 147.
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viewed as an internal control function that may encompass other ones.4 1 For
example, compliance can be viewed as part of risk management insofar as it is
attempting to manage the risk of legal and ethical violations in organizations.4 2
Having compliance be a part of risk management does not change its basic
function but is just a way of organizing the hierarchy of internal controls in an
organization.
B. Origins
There is a rich, scholarly literature on the origins of compliance, and
writers on compliance often restate what has become a standard story.4 3 This
Article presents an origin account only to emphasize a point that has sometimes
been downplayed in other origin stories and that is important for its main
arguments. This point is that there is both a regulatory and a criminal law origin
to compliance, which explains why federal regulators and prosecutors are
actively involved in and shape this field and affect the professionalization of
compliance. Under the regulatory origin story, as a result of the growth of the
federal administrative state in the twentieth century, organizations operating in
regulated sectors of the economy found their activities subject to a growing
number of detailed laws and regulations.4 4
From a purely functional
perspective, the organizations needed someone to keep track of all the pertinent
regulatory obligations, to see how they affected or shaped firm operations, and
then to guide employees and other firm agents in complying with the obligations
when they conducted the organization's business and affairs.4 5 It made sense
for organizational insiders to do these tasks because they would have detailed
knowledge and understanding of the organization's activities and would be on

41. See id. at 181-86 (explaining the relationship between internal control and enterprise
risk management). See also COMM. OF SPONSORING ORGS. OF THE TREADWAY COMM'N,
ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT: ALIGNING RISK WITH STRATEGY AND PERFORMANCE, Vol. 1, at

10 (June 2017) (defining enterprise risk management as "[t]he culture, capabilities, and practices,
integrated with strategy-setting and performance, that organizations rely on to manage risk in
creating, preserving, and realizing value") (emphasis omitted).
42. See, e.g., Griffith, supra note 13, at 2083 ("Compliance may thus be seen as a risk or
control function, the core mission of which is to minimize downside risk associated with
misconduct.").
43. See, e.g., Michele
DeStefano,
Creating a Culture of Compliance: Why
Departmentalization May Not Be the Answer, 10 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 71, 87-91 (2014) (providing

a criminal law story); Griffith, supra note 13, at 2083-92 (providing an almost exclusively criminal
origin story); Donald C. Langevoort, Monitoring: The Behavioral Economics of Corporate
Compliance with Law, 2002 COLuM. BUS. L. REV. 71, 77-79 (2002) (presenting a criminal law and
regulatory origin story); John H. Walsh, Institution-BasedFinancialRegulation:A ThirdParadigm,
49 HARV. INT'L L.J. 381, 390-92 (2008) (discussing the advent of the chief compliance officer in
broker-dealers and investment advisers).
44. See MILLER, supra note 1, at 195-96 (explaining that the growth in the administrative
state is a fundamental reason for the growth of compliance).
45. See Baer, Governing Corporate Compliance, supra note 36, at 959-60.
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hand to train and guide organizational actors in properly conducting their
activities in accordance with the regulations. The compliance function thus
became a necessary part of a regulated firm.
In certain industries, Congress and federal regulators directly or indirectly
imposed a compliance function on the regulated organization. An early
example was in commercial banking, where Congress required banks to have
an anti-money laundering compliance program with a compliance officer to
oversee it.4 6 Generally, however, federal regulation, rather than legislation,
imposed the compliance function or program on the regulated organization. To
take just a few examples, the Office of the Inspector General of Health and
Human Services imposed it upon hospitals;4 7 the Securities and Exchange
Commission did the same for investment advisers and investment companies; 4 8
and the self-regulatory organizations in financial services required
broker-dealers to have a CCO to establish and direct the compliance department
and to guide the broker-dealer's board and management in compliance
matters.4 9 Indeed, as the nature of compliance became more standardized over
time, the federal statutory and regulatory imposition of a compliance program
became more detailed, whether in the law or in regulation, to reflect the
generally understood model of compliance."
The regulatory origin story of compliance also includes the fact that, from
an enforcement perspective, federal regulators could use the legal doctrine of
respondeat superior to hold an organization liable for misconduct by its
employees and other agents (i.e., misconduct involving their failure to follow

46. See 31 U.S.C. § 5318(h) (requiring a financial institution to establish an "anti-money
laundering program[]" with, at a minimum, (i) "internal policies, procedures and controls," (ii) "a
compliance officer," (iii) "employee training," and (iv) "an independent audit function to test" the
program).

47. See also Publication of the OIG Compliance Program Guidance for Hospitals, 63 Fed.
Reg. 8987, 8993 (Feb. 23, 1998).
48. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-7 (2020) (investment adviser); 17 C.F.R. § 270.38a-1
(2020) (investment company).
49. See James A. Fanto, Surveillant and Counselor: A Reorientation in Compliance for
Broker-Dealers, 2014 BYU L. REV. 1121, 1130-43 (2014) (discussing the FINRA rules); FIN.
INDUS. REGUL.

AUTH.,

INC., RULE 3130, ANNUAL CERTIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE AND

SUPERVISORY PROCESS, https://www.finra.org/rules-guidance/rulebooks/finra-rules (for brokerdealers) (last visited Dec. 10, 2020). The list can go on. See also BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED.
RSRV. SYS., SR 08-8/CA 08-11, COMPLIANCE RISK MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS AND OVERSIGHT AT
LARGE BANKING ORGANIZATIONS WITH COMPLEX COMPLIANCE PROFILES

(Oct.

16, 2008)

(oversight of compliance in these institutions).
50. A good example is in the detailed requirements for a compliance program that was
imposed on swap dealers both by statute in the Dodd-Frank Act, see 7 U.S.C. § 6s(k) (for swap
dealers); 15 U.S.C. § 78o-10(k) (2018) (for security-based swap dealers); by regulation by the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission, 17 C.F.R. § 3.3(a) (2020) (for swap dealers); and by the
SEC, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15Fk-1(c) (2020) (for security-based swap dealers).
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their regulatory obligations)>.
This organizational liability incentivizes an
organization to prevent this misconduct. It thus makes sense for an organization
to have a compliance function to keep track of the laws and regulations
governing the organization's activities, particularly if they are detailed and
complex, to instruct employees on how to do their work in compliance with
them and to monitor the employees conduct so as to prevent and detect legal
violations.52 In some cases, Congress and regulators did not rely just on
respondeat superior but made this organizational liability explicit. In the
brokerage industry, for example, Congress imposed a duty of supervision on a
registered broker-dealer, which made it liable as a supervisor if one of its
brokerage employees violated the law.5 3 Congress also provided broker-dealers
with a statutory defense to the liability: a firm would not be liable if it had an
effective and comprehensive system of supervision of the employees. 54 The
firm function that created and administered the supervisory system was the
compliance department. Through their prosecution of organizations because of
regulatory violations, regulatory enforcement officials (who are lawyers) thus
exert an authority over compliance and compliance officers, particularly when
they determine whether the organization's efforts to prevent and detect
violations (i.e., its compliance program) were adequate.
The criminal law origin story of compliance has been much emphasized
in the scholarly literature because criminal liability applies to all organizations,
not just to those that are regulated.55 This liability is also based upon the
organization's vicarious liability for the misconduct of its employees and
agents. 56 Under this story, many attribute the growth and nature of compliance
for U.S. organizations to the guidelines of the U.S. Sentencing Commission that
help determine the appropriate punishment for an organization in which
criminal conduct under federal law has occurred.57 The guidelines recommend

51.

See Fanto, supra note 49, at 1131 n.25 (citing Task Force on Broker-Dealer Supervision

and Compliance of the Comm. on Fed. Regul. of Secs., Broker-Dealer Supervision of Registered
Representatives and Branch Office Operations,44 BUS. LAW. 1361, 1363-64 (1989)).

52. See, e.g., Griffith, supra note 13, at 2082-83.
53. See Langevoort, supra note 43, at 78 (explaining the statutory basis for this duty in
Section 15(b)(4)(E) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934); James A. Fanto, The Vanishing
Supervisor, 41 J. CORP. L. 117, 138-40 (2015) (discussing the industry and regulatory background
and the legislative history of this statutory provision).
54. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4)(E) (2018).
55.

Examples include: Baer, Governing Corporate Compliance, supra note 36, at 962-66;

Griffith, supra note 13, at 2083-86; Veronica Root, Coordinating Compliance Incentives, 102
CORNELL L. REV. 1003 (2017).
56.

See Samuel W. Buell, The Blaming Function of Entity Criminal Liability, 81 IND. L.J.

473, 474-76 (2006) (discussing the flourishing of this liability, which common law courts imported
from tort law); Jennifer Arlen & Reinier Kraakman, Controlling Corporate Misconduct: An
Analysis of Corporate LiabilityRegimes, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 687, 689-90 (1997) (discussing the

evolution of this wide-ranging vicarious liability and efforts by lawmakers to reduce it).
57.

See, e.g., Griffith, supra note 13, at 2084-86.
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that an organization receive a benefit in sentencing treatment if it had an
effective compliance program at the time of the misconduct. 58 They also set
forth the features of an effective program, which include having an official who
is responsible for the day-to-day operations of the compliance function. 59 As
the criminal law origin story goes, the guidelines powerfully incentivize an
organization to have a compliance function because nearly every organization
can be subject to criminal liability under federal law for the misconduct of its
employees. But the main point here is that the guidelines made federal
prosecutors, who recommend sentences, key authority figures in compliance
because they would have a strong voice in determining what is an effective
compliance program.
In fact, federal prosecutors have embraced their role in compliance and
recognize their power because a criminal indictment of an organization can be
devastating for it. 60 The Department of Justice ("DOJ") sets forth its
expectations for compliance in its prosecutorial manual and in guidelines on the
enforcement of specific laws, such as the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, which
it commonly uses in the prosecution of organizations. 61 In numerous settlement
agreements with organizations, federal prosecutors set out their views on the
model of a compliance program by mandating how the targeted organization
will improve its compliance function in the future.6 2 At one point, the DOJ even
had a compliance "expert" on its staff that guided organizations on the DOJ's
expectations for compliance, 63 and it has set these out in published guidelines.64

See U.S. SENT'G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1(b) (U.S. SENT'G COMM'N 2016).
59. See id. In a later amendment, the guidelines expanded the definition of an effective
compliance program to include compliance with ethical standards, in addition to law and regulation.
See David Hess, Ethical Infrastructuresand Evidence-Based Corporate Compliance and Ethics
Programs:Policy Implicationsfrom the EmpiricalEvidence, 12 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 317, 335 (2016)
(discussing the amendment of the guidelines to require that an organization's compliance program
encourage the creation of an organizational culture promoting "ethical conduct").
60. One of the examples of a firm collapsing as a result of prosecution is Arthur Andersen,
which was criminally indicted and convicted for its involvement in the Enron scandal. Although its
conviction was later overturned, it had long before gone out of business as clients fled it. See Arthur
Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696 (2005). For a discussion of the firm's predicament,
see MILLER, supranote 1, at 431-33.
58.

61.

See U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL PROSECUTION OF BUSINESS

ORGANIZATIONS, 9-28.800, at 14-16 (2019) (discussing compliance programs); CRIM. DIV., U.S.
DEPT' OF JUST. & ENF'T DIV., SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, A RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE U.S. FOREIGN
CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 56-63 (2012) (setting out the elements of an effective program).

62.

For a discussion of this phenomenon, see Jennifer Arlen & Marcel Kahan, Corporate

Governance Regulation Through Nonprosecution, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 323, 335-39 (2017)

(discussing the compliance program mandates imposed under agreements to defer prosecution).
63. See Hui Chen & Eugene Soltes, Why Compliance ProgramsFail-and How to Fix
Them, HARV. BUS. REV., Mar.-Apr. 2018, at 116. Hui Chen was the first compliance expert hired
by the Department of Justice.
64.

See CRIM. DIV., U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., EVALUATION OF CORPORATE COMPLIANCE

PROGRAMS (Apr. 2019).
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As will be discussed below, the importance of federal prosecutors (who are all
lawyers) in compliance has had a significant impact upon the
professionalization of this field.
C. The Model of Compliance
1.

Compliance Activities

Whatever its genealogy, compliance, with compliance programs and
compliance officers, is now an established part of the U.S. organizational
landscape. Moreover, there is now a standard understanding, or "model," for
the functions of a compliance program and the tasks of compliance officers in
it.65 This distinctness of the compliance role or occupation is importantbecause,
as discussed below, it is a pre-condition for the professionalization of
compliance. The initial task in a compliance program is for compliance officers
to identify the legal obligations applicable to the organization and its employees
and agents, ideally determining those with the greatest probability of being
violated and those whose violations will have the greatest consequences-this
is a compliance "risk analysis." 66 The next task that follows from the first is for
the officers to draft compliance policies and procedures to address these
obligations in consideration of their risks-the policies set out general
principles of conduct for organizational actors while the procedures instruct
them on how, in detail, to conduct their affairs and business in accordance with
the applicable laws and regulations. 67 Drafting the procedures is a highly
distinctive compliance task because in doing so compliance officers must be
intimately familiar with the organization's affairs and understand how the
applicable legal obligations can be translated into the actual conduct of
organizational activities.
As the next logical part of the compliance program, compliance officers
train employees and other organizational agents in the policies and procedures. 68

65. See Langevoort, supra note 43, at 81-83 (setting forward this model); DeStefano, supra
note 43, at 94-97 (describing basic tasks). Indeed, now models of compliance are available in
standardized guidelines. See INT'L ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION, supra note 12 (providing a
detailed model of compliance).
66.

See INT'L ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION, supra note 12, at 12 (paragraph 5.3.4 lists these

and other compliance responsibilities); Robert C. Bird & Stephen Kim Park, Turning Corporate
Compliance into Competitive Advantage, 19 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 285, 297 (2017) (arguing for a model
of compliance that focuses on a dynamic analysis of the compliance risks).
67.

See COMPLIANCE & LEGAL Div., SEC. INDUS. ASS'N, WHITE PAPER ON THE ROLE OF

COMPLIANCE 4 (2005) (discussing this task in compliance in the securities industry). The policies
and procedures also need to incorporate the organization's code of ethics and any other non-legal
obligation that the organization wants its employees and other agents to follow. See DeStefano,
supra note 43, at 95-96 (highlighting the role of compliance in enforcing ethical obligations).
68.

See INT'L ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION, supra note

12, at 12 (paragraph 5.3.4,

"providing or organizing on-going training support for employees to ensure that all relevant
employees are trained on a regular basis"). See also U.S. SENT'G GUIDELINES MANUAL §
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This internal educational mission is a special, distinctive part of the compliance
occupation where the compliance officer has to be somewhat of a teacher who
experiments with teaching methods. 69 Significantly, and related to this
educational role, compliance officers also advise organizational actors generally
on almost a daily basis on how to conduct themselves in accordance with these
guidelines, as well as on how to deal with new or unusual situations falling
outside the express terms of the policies and procedures.70 Here-and this is
significant for the professional identity of compliance officers-the advisory
compliance activity seems close to providing legal advice because, in a
situation, the officer is instructing an employee how to engage in an activity in
accordance with a given law or regulation.7 1
One of the main activities of compliance officers, which can be used to
characterize them in a negative way 72 but also plays a major role in their
professional story, is that they monitor organizational actors to ensure that the
latter are following, and not violating, the policies and procedures. 73 In this
role, the compliance officer is like a "cop on the beat;" although, as discussed
below, the monitoring involves a considerable use of surveillance technology. 74

8B2.1(b)(4)(A) (U.S. SENT'G COMM'N 2016) (identifying "effective training programs" as a feature
of an effective compliance and ethics program). Some regulatory systems mandate the compliance
training. See, e.g., FIN. INDUS. REGUL. AUTH., INC., supra note 49, at RULE 3110(b) (making

training of personnel and an annual compliance meeting with each associated person part of a
mandatory supervisory system).
69.

See, e.g., Kurt Wachholz, Compliance Training, in MODERN COMPLIANCE: BEST

PRACTICES FOR SECURITIES & FINANCE 225 (David H. Lui & John H. Walsh eds., 2015) (a

compliance officer describes his experiences as an educator).
70.

See INT'L ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION, supra note

12, at 12 (paragraph 5.3.4,

explaining that one of the tasks of the compliance department is "providing objective advice to the
organization on compliance-related matters"). See Fanto, supra note 49, at 1163-64 (arguing for
the central place of this advisory role).
71. See R. Gerald Baker, What is Compliance?, in MODERN COMPLIANCE: BEST PRACTICES
FOR SECURITIES & FINANCE 63, 66-67 (David H. Lui & John H. Walsh eds., 2015) (pointing out

that the advisory function "immediately comes to mind" when identifying the responsibilities of a
compliance officer, but noting that it may involve other control groups like legal). See also Jennifer
M. Pacella, The Regulation of Lawyers in Compliance, 95 WASH. L. REv. 947, 956 (2020)

(observing that lawyers in compliance roles offer firms and employees something like legal advice
and arguing that such offering does not necessarily constitute legal practice).
72. See, e.g., Kirsten Grind & Emily Glazer, Nuns With Guns: The Strange Day-to-Day
Struggles Between Bankers and Regulators, WALL ST. J. (May 30, 2016) (describing the growth in

compliance after the financial crisis, with bankers picturing compliance staff as nuns carrying guns).
73.

See INT'L ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION, supra note 12, at 12 (paragraph 5.3.4, a

compliance program "monitor[s] and measur[es] compliance performance"). See also U.S. SENT'G
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1(b)(5)(A) (U.S. SENT'G COMM'N 2016) (stating that an effective
compliance and ethics program has "monitoring and auditing to detect criminal conduct"). See also
Langevoort, supra note 43, at 91-100 (discussing the monitoring role of compliance officers and
the costs associated with it).
74. See infra text accompanying notes 235-37.
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This beat cop is, in some domains, required to conduct internal inspections of
the organization's activities and departments. 5 This monitoring, in turn, leads
to other activities: compliance officers must follow up on any indication of a
problem (often known as a "red flag")? 6 to see whether in fact a violation has
occurred." This means that compliance officers engage in investigations, but,
as in the case of providing legal advice on policies and procedures, this
investigatory activity intersects with one of the main characteristics of inside
and outside counsel to an organization-i.e., who are members of the legal
profession-which is conducting investigations on the organization's behalf.
Because a legal violation by an employee may trigger the organization's
liability and because the legal department or counsel is generally tasked with
the legal defense of the organization, the legal department is also charged with
investigations of legal violations.7 8 The intersection or overlap between
compliance and legal on investigations points to compliance's blurry
relationship with an established profession, which strongly affects its own
professionalization.
Another task of compliance officers that follows from the monitoring is to
check on the functioning and effectiveness of compliance in the organization
and, if necessary, to modify the compliance program to address the occurrence
of violations and to take account of any legal or business developments affecting
the organization.7 9 Among other things, compliance officers should probe into

75.

See, e.g., FIN. INDUS. REGUL. AUTH., INC., supra note 49, at RULE 3110(c) (requiring a

firm to conduct an annual review of its businesses and an inspection (annual or otherwise, depending
upon its size and operations) of its offices). See also Miriam H. Baer, Confronting the Two Faces
of CorporateFraud,66 FLA. L. REV. 87, 148-54 (2014) (arguing that both government enforcement
officials and many corporate actors actually prefer compliance to be a policing function, ratherthan
one designed to prevent misconduct, in their firm).
76. See, e.g., J. Christopher Jackson, Seeking to Avoid Chief Compliance Officer Liability,
in MODERN COMPLIANCE: BEST PRACTICES FOR SECURITIES & FINANCE 679, 697-98 (David H.
Lui & John H. Walsh eds., 2015) (discussing what constitutes a red flag).

77. See, e.g., Publication of the OIG Compliance Program Guidance for Hospitals, supra
note 47, 63 Fed. Reg., at 8994 (one of the tasks of the chief compliance officer is "[i]ndependently
investigating and acting on matters related to compliance, including the flexibility to design and
coordinate internal investigations (e.g., responding to reports of problems or suspected violations)
and any resulting corrective action with all hospital departments, providers and sub-providers,
agents and, if appropriate, independent contractors") (footnote omitted). One way in which
compliance officers find out about potential violations is by reports made through an organization's
system for confidential reporting or "whistleblowing," which is an element of a compliance
program. See U.S. SENT'G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1(b)(5)(C) (U.S. SENT'G COMM'N 2016)
(identifying this kind of system). Compliance officers may be tasked with following up on the
reports.
78.

See N.Y.C. BAR ASS'N, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON THE LAWYER'S ROLE IN

CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 143-61 (2006) (discussing internal investigations at length as part of
inside counsel's role).
79.

See INT'L ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION, supra note 12, at 12 (paragraph 5.3.4, listing

these and other responsibilities of the compliance department). See also U.S. SENT'G GUIDELINES
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the underlying causes of a legal violation to see whether the compliance
program was sufficiently comprehensive to prevent it. 80 Here, as in the case of
investigations, compliance intersects or overlaps with another internal control
activity or occupation, internal audit; internal auditors also audit the functioning
of compliance in the organization as part of their mandate, just as they check on
all organizational activities.8 1 This intersection, too, adds further complications
to the professional identity of compliance officers, even if the general contours
of the occupations of compliance officer and internal auditor are different.
An important, and distinct, role of a compliance officer that appears
primarily, but not exclusively, in regulated firms is being the "point person" for
inquiries from the applicable regulator or regulators and coordinator for
regulatory examinations or inspections.8 2 Depending upon the industry, the
regulator may ask for information from the firm, require reports from it,
particularly on violations of regulations, conduct inspections (announced or
unannounced) on particular issues of concern, and conduct regular examinations
of the firm. 83 In almost all of these cases, compliance officers are likely to be
involved in providing the regulator with the information or access that it
demands and in communicating to their firm the needs and demands of the
regulator. Even in non-regulated organizations, compliance officers may be the
organization with whom government officials, such as prosecutors or a
court-appointed monitor, may communicate, particularly as to the firm's

MANUAL § 8B2.1(b)(5)(A), (B), & (7) (U.S. SENT'G COMM'N 2016) (stating that an effective

compliance and ethics program has "monitoring and auditing to detect criminal conduct"
((b)(5)(A)); "evaluate[s] periodically [its] effectiveness" ((b)(5)(B)); and, after the occurrence of
criminal conduct, takes "reasonable steps" to prevent its recurrence "including making any
necessary modifications to the ... program," ((b)(7)))). Again, this evaluation of the effectiveness
of a compliance program may be mandated by regulation. See, e.g., FIN. INDUS. REGUL. AUTH.,
INC., supra note 49, at RULE 3120(a) (requiring a supervisory control system to test a firm's
supervisory system); FIN. INDUS. REGUL. AUTH., INC., supranote 49, at RULE 3130(b) (requiring a
broker-dealer's chief executive officer to certify annually, among other things, that the firm has in
place processes "to test and modify" its compliance and supervisory procedures).
80. See David H. Lui, Core Requirements of a Compliance Program, in MODERN
COMPLIANCE: BEST PRACTICES FOR SECURITIES & FINANCE 93, 107-11 (David H. Lui & John H.

Walsh eds., 2015) (discussing testing and identifying testing involving causes of a violation as a
"forensic testing").
81.

See COMM. OF SPONSORING ORGS. OF THE TREADWAY COMM'N, INTERNAL CONTROL,

supra note 34, at 154 (stating that an audit should include internal control functions). See also Lui,
supra note 80, at 110-11 (arguing that compliance and internal audit should coordinate their testing
of the compliance program).
82. See Baker, supra note 71, at 69-70 (describing this task and its importance).
83. To take just the example of a broker-dealer, a firm has to provide information on rule
violations and other misconduct to FINRA. See FIN. INDUS. REGUL. AUTH., INC., supra note 49, at
RULE 4530. The firm must also provide information, testimony, and access to records. See id. at
RULE 8210.
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compliance program-especially when a firm needs to improve it following the
occurrence of legal violations in the organization.84
A key set of tasks that compliance officers perform and that particularly
distinguishes them in an organization involves their role in the promotion of
ethics and the firm's culture.8 5 This is why some organizations use the "CECO"
(Chief Ethics and Compliance Officer), ratherthan the CCO title, to emphasize
that the compliance officer has ethical responsibilities. 86 In some respects, these
ethical tasks overlap with the compliance ones discussed above. For example,
compliance officers draft policies and procedures that take into account the
organization's code of ethics, as well as applicable law and regulation, train
employees in the code, and monitor their compliance with it.87 However,
because ethical guidelines are likely to be vaguer and fuzzier than the law,
compliance officers might have to spend more time advising organizational
actors about whether their conduct is in accordance with the guidelines. 88 This
role of compliance officers in promoting ethics in the firm is, moreover, directly
related to their contribution to an organization's culture because culture, which
generally means the conduct and attitudes that typify an organization, is closely
bound up with its ethical guidelines or code of ethics, which generally deal with
how organizational actors behave towards one another, their clients, other
organizations, and the government. 89
2.

Compliance's Organizational Place

As will be discussed below, a key part of the analysis of compliance's
professionalization involves an understanding of the position of compliance
officers in organizations-both as an abstract matter (i.e., their place in the
organizational hierarchy) and as a physical matter (i.e., their literal physical
place in an organization).
The abstract matter is actually part of the
organization's governance which assigns decision-making and other authority

84. See Rory Van Loo, Regulatory Monitors: Policing Firms in the Compliance Era, 119
COLUM. L. REV. 369, 398-402 (2019) (discussing the phenomenon of regulatory monitors who can
monitor and inspect firms and their interaction with compliance departments).
85. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines refer to an organization's "compliance and ethics
program." See U.S. SENT'G GUIDELINES MANUAL
86.

§ 8B2.1

(U.S. SENT'G COMM'N 2016).

See

SOC'Y OF CORP. COMPLIANCE & ETHICS & NYSE GOVERNANCE SERV.,
COMPLIANCE AND ETHICS PROGRAM ENVIRONMENT REPORT 9 (2014) (noting that 8% of those

surveyed use this title).
87. See Lee Augsburger, How Compliance Can Teach Ethics, in MODERN COMPLIANCE:
BEST PRACTICES FOR SECURITIES & FINANCE 179, 190 (David H. Lui & John H. Walsh eds., 2015)

(making this point about their similarities).
88. See id. (noting that "[r]egulation is hard; ethics is soft").
89. See generally Hess, supra note 59, at 347-51 (presenting a model of organizational
conduct in which the organizational climate is foundational, subsuming culture, and upon which
ethics and compliance are built).
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of organizational actors over given matters and other actors. 90 In fact, the
compliance program is expected to assign compliance responsibilities and
decision-making to organizational actors, including compliance officers
themselves, in order to set forth the governance of compliance.91 As in the case
of compliance tasks discussed in the preceding section, compliance governance
has become standardized through law, regulation, and practice. The physical
position or "departmentalization" of compliance generally follows from its
governance. If, as is clear from the preceding section, compliance officers have
a distinct compliance role and tasks, they are likely to belong to a particular
department in an organization and even to be set apart in their own physical
location. 92
Typical compliance governance today requires that the governing body of
an organization, such as its board of directors, insist that the organization have
a compliance program, oversee its implementation, regularly receive its
findings, and periodically review its effectiveness. 93 Indeed, boards of public
companies know that one of their main oversight duties is to ensure that the
organization has in place an effective compliance function.94 Boards of
companies listed on stock exchanges are required to put compliance oversight
within the mandate of the board's audit committee 95 and they are increasingly
encouraged to establish a compliance committee for this task.96 Senior

90.

See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW: COMPLIANCE, RISK MANAGEMENT, AND ENFORCEMENT

§ 3.01 (AM. L. INST., Tentative Draft No. 1, 2019); MILLER, supra note 1, at 2 (discussing
governance).
91. See U.S. SENT'G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1(b)(2) (U.S. SENT'G COMM'N 2016)
(including this governance within the compliance and ethics program).
92. See DeStefano, supra note 43, at 73-75 (discussing compliance departments generally).
93. See generally COMM. OF SPONSORING ORGS. OF THE TREADWAY COMM'N, supra note
34, at 46 (discussing this governance structure); U.S. SENT'G GUIDELINES MANUAL §
8B2.1(b)(2)(A) (U.S. SENT'G COMM'N 2016) (specifying the board's role).
94. See, e.g., In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 970 (Del. Ch. 1996)
("a director's obligation includes a duty to attempt in good faith to assure that a corporate
information and reporting system, which the board concludes is adequate, exists"); Stone v. Ritter,
911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006) (accepting that the board's oversight obligation includes the responsibility
to ensure that the corporation has an adequate compliance function). See also CORP. LS. COMM.,
A.B.A. SECTION OF BUS. L., CORPORATE DIRECTOR'S GUIDEBOOK, 66 BUS. LAW. 975, 986 (2011)

(discussing this oversight); Stavros Gadinis & Amelia Miazad, The Hidden Power of Compliance,
103 MINN. L. REV. 2135, 2156-60 (2019) (contending that legal and compliance officers can
influence the board's exercise of their Caremark duty when they provide the board with detailed
reports on legal violations within the firm, which reports the board ignores at its peril).
95. See NYSE, INC., LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 303A.07(b)(i)(A) (2018) (specifying this
role of the audit committee). See also A.B.A. SECTION OF BUS. L., CORP. LAWS COMM., supra note

94, at 1018, 1022 (discussing how audit committee meets its oversight responsibilities over
compliance).
96. The audit committee may be aided by another committee to fulfill this mission. See
A.B.A. SECTION OF BUS. L., CORP. LAWS COMM., supra note 94, at 999-1000 (noting how

companies have established a compliance or legal-affairs committee to ease the burden of the audit

202

NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 35:1

executives of the organization, chiefly the CEO, have the responsibility of
directing the formulation and implementation of the compliance program and
of assuring that the board, or a board committee, is in place and functioning

well. 97
This governance structure necessitates that there be a group or department
responsible for designing and implementing the compliance program in the
organization, and an individual, either the CCO or CECO, who administers and
manages it, and who represents it before the board and senior executives. 98
Turning to the CCO first, this officer is the organization's specialist in
compliance who is responsible for the design and implementation of the
compliance program, and who thus must be knowledgeable about the subject. 99
This position is mandated in certain regulated industries00 and-this is
important for the professional discussion-is increasingly one that should not

committee). See also Marchand v. Barnhill, 212 A.3d 805, 822 (Del. 2019) (stating that a board
must itself have "protocols" and a committee structure to ensure that it receives information about
the firm's compliance with legal obligations). See generally PwC STATE OF COMPLIANCE STUDY
2016: LAYING A STRATEGIC FOUNDATION FOR STRONG COMPLIANCE RISK MANAGEMENT 3, 13
(2016) (global survey of 800 executives reveals that 20% of firms have a "separate, stand-alone
compliance/ethics committee," while 65% report that the audit committee oversees compliance).
But see John Armour et al., Taking Compliance Seriously, 37 YALE J. ON REG. 1 (2020) (contending
that, on the basis of their stock-based compensation, directors have an inadequate incentive to
promote compliance in organizations and that their oversight duty is too weak to promote effective
compliance; arguing for a clawback of director compensation to address this problem); John Armour
et al., Board Compliance, 104 MINN. L. REv. 1191 (2020) (presenting data on the fact that few U.S.
companies have designated board compliance committees, proposing reasons for this absence, and
explaining why boards often resist the compliance oversight role).
97. See U.S. SENT'G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1(b)(2)(B) (U.S. SENT'G COMM'N 2016)
(specifying this role).
98. See DeMott, supra note 7, at 64 (discussing this position).
99. See INT'L ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION, supra note 12, at 10 ("Many organizations have
a dedicated person (e.g. a compliance officer) responsible for day-to-day compliance
management....").

See

also

CONTROL RISKS,

INTERNATIONAL

BUSINESS

ATTITUDES

TO

COMPLIANCE: REPORT 2017 11 (2017) (reporting that 47% of U.S. companies surveyed in a global

survey have a compliance function led by a dedicated compliance officer); U.S. SENT'G GUIDELINES
MANUAL § 8B2.1(b)(2)(C) (U.S. SENT'G COMM'N 2016) ("Specific individual(s) within the
organization shall be delegated day-to-day operational responsibility for the compliance and ethics
program.").

100. See, e.g., Off. of Inspector Gen., Dep't of Health and Hum. Servs., supra note 47, at
8989 (noting that one element of a compliance program for hospitals is "[t]he designation of a chief
compliance officer . .. charged with the responsibility of operating and monitoring the compliance
program"); FIN. INDUS. REGUL. AUTH., INC., supra note 49, at RULE 3130(a) (requiring a
broker-dealer that is a member of FINRA to designate one or more principals as CCO(s)); 17 C.F.R.
§ 275.206(4)-7(c) (2020) (requiring a registered investment adviser to have a CCO); 17 C.F.R. §
270.38a-1(a)(4) (2020) (requiring the same for a registered investment company);
15 U.S.C. § 78o-8(k)(1) (2020) (requiring each security-based swap dealer and participant to have
a CCO); 17 C.F.R. § 240.15Fk-1(a) (2020) (implementing the CCO rule in security-based swap
dealers and major security-based participants).
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be held by someone with another position in the organization." 1 Moreover, as
will be important for the discussion below, today, in large organizations, it is
increasingly a position filled by a lawyer from an exemplary background-often
one who has had prestigious federal prosecutorial or regulatory positions. 102
Reporting by the CCO is also indicative of the position's current
importance and has professional implications.
Organizational reporting
generally has two meanings: an organizational actor (i) reports to one who has
authority over the actor's position and who determines the actor's conditions of
employment, and (ii) provides information to other such actors. Both meanings
are significant in highlighting the CCO's distinct organizational role. The
recommended structure today is to have the CCO under the direct authority of
the CEO and have a seat at the CEO's table as a key officer with the board or a
board committee having a say on, or a veto over, the hiring and firing of the
officer.10 3 With respect to information reporting, it is becoming standard
practice for the CCO to report directly to the board or board committee in
addition to reporting to the CEO or another senior executive. 14

101.

See,

e.g., BASEL

COMM.

ON BANKING

SUPERVISION,

COMPLIANCE

AND

THE

COMPLIANCE FUNCTION IN BANKS 12 (2005) ("The independence of the head of compliance and

any other staff having compliance responsibilities may be undermined if they are placed in a
position where there is a real or potential conflict between their compliance responsibilities and
their other responsibilities. It is the preference of the Committee that compliance function staff
perform only compliance responsibilities."). Regulators allow smaller firms to allow other
employees to fulfill the CCO role-for cost reasons. See id.
102. See Miriam H. Baer, Compliance Elites, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 1599, 1601-02 (2020)
(discussing this elitism in CCOs and its consequences for having these CCOs detect misconduct in
organizations).
103. See, e.g., Dave Lefort, Poll-apalooza: Let us help you benchmark your compliance
program, COMPLIANCE WEEK 2018 SURVEY (June 4, 2018), https://www.complianceweek.com/p

oll-apalooza-let-us-help-you-benchmark-your-compliance-program/2245.article (presenting data
on, among other things, CCO reporting from an audience pool at the Complaince Week 2018
conference in Washington, D.C.); ETHICS & COMPLIANCE CERTIFICATION INST., PRINCIPLES AND

ECI'S BLUE
RIBBON PANEL 18-20 (2016) (identifying these best practices); 17 C.F.R. § 270.38a-1(a)(4)(i)
(ii) (2020) (stating the board of a registered investment company (including a majority of its
independent directors) must approve the hiring, compensation, and removal of the company's chief
compliance officer).
104. See INT'L ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION, supra note 12, at 11 (requiring that the
governing body and top management have a compliance department with "clear and unambiguous
support from and direct access to the governing body and top management"); U.S. SENT'G
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1(b)(2)(C) (U.S. SENT'G COMM'N 2016) (providing that
"[i]ndividual(s) with operational responsibility [for the compliance and ethics program] shall report
periodically to high-level personnel and, as appropriate, to the governing authority, or an
appropriate subgroup of the governing authority"). See generally John H. Walsh, Right the First
Time: Regulation, Quality, and Preventive Compliance in the Securities Industry, 1997 COLUM.
BUS. L. REV. 165, 236 (1997) (discussing generally the value of this CCO reporting in
broker-dealers and investment advisers).
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The compliance department, which the CCO administers and manages, is
composed of compliance officers who conduct all the compliance program tasks
identified in the preceding section. 105 Whether the officers work together-and
separately from others-in the compliance department, are integrated with the
operations of the organization, or engage in some combination of both, they
report to and are under the authority of the CCO. 106 This organizational
separation and line of authority distinguishes the officers from other
organizational actors and other occupational categories-even from those in
other internal control functions. They also reinforce the distinctness of the
compliance occupation and, as discussed below, make possible and conceivable
its professionalization.
II. THE PROFESSIONAL STATUS OF THE COMPLIANCE FIELD
This Part discusses the ways in which the activity of compliance has
progressed along the path to achieving professional status. The Part first briefly
reviews the prior literature on professions in general to identify the key features
of an activity having professional status. It then examines how compliance
comports with this professional model, first by reviewing other analyses of
compliance as a profession. It then points out how compliance practitioners do
not possess a defining feature of professional status, which is their control over
the practice of compliance (i.e., a monopoly of practice), which the state
governments grant to a field through licensing.
A. The StandardFeaturesof a Profession
The most well-known, established professions have been the subject of a
rich scholarly analysis and debate. 107 This is not the place to consider in detail
the literature, which, among other things, looks at the history and social position
of the professions. 108 For the analytical purposes here, which are to examine
the professional status of compliance officers and its relationship to other
professions-particularly the law-several insights from that scholarship are
particularly useful. First, scholars of professions identify the general features

105. See Baker, supra note 71, at 64 (speaking of the "big C" as being the compliance
department).
106.

See id. at 75-6 (discussing different compliance structures in firms).

107.

For one of the classic studies on them, see EMILE DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR

IN SOCIETY (George Simpson trans., 1933) (1893). For a review of the scholarly literature on
professions, see ANDREW ABBOTT, THE SYSTEM OF PROFESSIONS: AN ESSAY ON THE DIVISION OF
EXPERT LABOR 9-20 (1988). See also RICHARD SUSSKIND & DANIEL SUSSKIND, THE FUTURE OF
THE PROFESSIONS: HOW TECHNOLOGY WILL TRANSFORM THE WORK OF HUMAN EXPERTS 23-30

(2015) (reviewing the theories of professions).
108.

See, e.g., BURTON J. BLEDSTEIN, THE CULTURE OF PROFESSIONALISM: THE MIDDLE

CLASS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF HIGHER EDUCATION IN AMERICA (1976); MAGALI SARFATTI

LARSON, THE RISE OF PROFESSIONALISM: A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS (1977). The focus will also
be primarily upon professionalization in the United States.
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of an occupation that achieves professional status. 109 These are (i) the
acquisition of a specific body of knowledge and skills in its application, which
involve judgment and discretion, (ii) training for the profession that is in
institutions of higher learning but that is controlled by the professional
practitioners, (iii) the sharing by practitioners of a social identity of being
engaged in a common endeavor, and (iv) the receiving from the government,
i.e., states, control over professional activities that is justified because of the
profession's contribution to the public interest." While a particular profession
might be characterized by its possession of one or more of the above features,
established professions generally have all of these features to some extent."'
Second, professions emerge and continue by exerting a recognized jurisdiction
or control over a social activity, often in opposition to other occupations seeking
that same jurisdiction.1 1 2 Third, being in a profession likely has a social status
effect, which may translate into certain economic rewards, but also other kinds
of benefits, such as symbolic ones.113
With respect to the first feature, for an occupation to achieve professional
status, its practitioners must acquire a defined body of generally theoretical
knowledge and the related practical skills in applying it that are necessary to
conduct the activity in question." 4 This knowledge and these skills should be
distinct from those used by people engaged in other occupations. One thinks of
the doctrinal knowledge required of the legal profession and the various skills
of its application, albeit in different kinds of contexts. The application of the
knowledge and the exercise of the skills typically require discretion and
judgment; a profession is a highly intellectual activity.1 1 5 In this application and
exercise, in other words, a professional activity is distinguished from a technical
occupation, which requires specialization, but which involves routines and less
judgment in its application. Of course, professional work involves routines as
well, and the self-presentation of a profession may downplay its routines and

109.

See FREIDSON, supranote 15, at 127 (setting forth these features).

110.

See id.

111. See id. at 127-28.
112. See ABBOTT, supra note 107, at 71 ("Every profession aims for a heartland of work
over which it has complete, legally established control... . Every profession aims not only to
possess such a heartland, but to defend and expand it.").
113. See FREIDSON, supra note 15, at 199. For a discussion of how the sustained criticism
of professionals as unworthy experts promoting their own social advancement undermined the
professional ideal of the legal profession of helping clients navigate between the market and the
government, see Dana A. Remus, ReconstructingProfessionalism,51 GA. L. REv. 807 (2017). See
also Rebecca Roiphe, The Decline of Professionalism,29 GEO. J. L. ETHICS 649 (2016) (similarly

arguing that the traditional understanding of professions as promoting the public good was lost as a
result of criticism of expertise and institutions, among other things).
114. See FREIDSON, supra note 15, at 34-35 ("The ideal-typical position of professionalism
is founded on the official belief that the knowledge and skill of a particular specialization requires
a foundation in abstract concepts and formal learning and necessitates the exercise of discretion.").
115.

See id.
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overemphasize professional judgment.116 But in its ideal form, a professional
uses judgment in applying acquired knowledge to a particular situation.
Another important professional feature is that the acquisition of the
required body of knowledge and the basic associated practical skills takes place
in universities, not in the labor market." Professional schools located within
universities act as a required gateway or passage for aspiring members of a
profession because in these institutions professionals devoted to research and
education train students for their future occupation. 18 Thus, we have the
paradigmatic examples of medical and law schools, where doctors and lawyers,
albeit ones devoted to research, train the next generation of practitioners. The
university is also important for the development of theoretical professional
knowledge by scholar-professionals who are insulated from the pressures of
practice and who can reflect on developments and create new approaches in the
field.119 Certainly professionals develop their knowledge and, particularly, their
skills outside professional schools, but their basic professional formation occurs
in them. The connection with the university also conveys a cultural and social
prestige on the members of the profession and adds to its authority, particularly
in its jurisdictional contests with other occupations and professions. 120
Yet another "ideal" professional feature is the consciousness by its
practitioners that they engage in a common occupation; they have a shared
social identity associated with being members of a specific profession. 121 The
consciousness and identity generally emerge from the shared professional
formation in the university-based professional schools and are furthersupported
and promoted by societies and organizations devoted to standardizing,
advancing, and sharing professional knowledge and practices, which
professionals customarily join. 122 Professionals, in other words, have a strong
self-identity that is connected with their occupation and that they share only
with other similar professionals. This self-identity may be furthered by and
related to the social status and social recognition that is accorded to established
professions by those outside them. 123
An additional professional feature-and indeed the most distinguishing
one-is that the government accords to the occupation official recognition by
giving its practitioners a monopoly of practice and exclusive control of the
116.

See SUSSKIND & SUSSKIND, supra note 107, at 119-21 (making this point).

117.

See FREIDSON, supra note 15, at 84.

118.

See BLEDSTEIN, supra note 108, at 121-28.

119.

See FREIDSON, supra note 15, at 92; ABBOTT, supra note 107, at 55.

120. See FREIDSON, supra note 15, at 102-04; ABBOTT, supra note 107, at 53-54.
121. See FREIDSON, supra note 15, at 105-23 (describing an ideology whereby the
professional works for professional values); ABBOTT, supra note 107, at 119 (pointing out that
"professionals draw their self-esteem from their own world ... ").
122. See FREIDSON, supra note 15, at 141-46. This is an ideal, of course, since there is
generally a hierarchy within a profession.
123. See LARSON, supra note 108, at xvii (describing a profession as a social mobility
project).

THE PROFESSIONAL.IZATION OF COfPLTANCE

2021]

207

activity.12 The government thus makes it illegal for anyone to engage in the
profession unless the practitioner is an authorized member of it, and becoming
a member requires approval by current members of the profession through a
government-approved licensing process. Thus, state medical associations
control who can be a doctor, and state bar associations approve who can be a
lawyer. 125 The government's granting professional status to an occupation's
practitioners is occasionally referred to as the "grand bargain." 126 That is, the
government grants the status only to an occupation which convinces it that the
monopoly of practice is necessary for the public benefit or interest; a profession
justifies its special status on the grounds that the service it provides is both
essential to public welfare and should be engaged in only by professionals,
again for the public interest.127 In the United States, the "government" granting
professional status through a license is a state; in other countries, the national
government determines which occupation is a profession. 128 Therefore, while
those engaged in many occupations today call themselves "professionals," 12 9
they often do not have the monopoly of practice that is characteristic of
established professions and that is indicative of the fundamental importance of
the social activities that professions conduct.
Aside from its ideal features, a key point about a profession is that it must
have jurisdiction over a domain of social activities and defend it from
encroachment by other professions and occupations."' This assertion of
jurisdiction is related to the above feature of the government's grant of
monopoly of practice because a profession that has this monopoly over a set of
activities has a legal basis for its jurisdiction. 131 A profession also achieves and
retains its jurisdiction by persuading the public (i.e., its clients) to grant this
exclusive control to the profession and by taking over particular tasks in the
workplace. 13 2 Moreover, while a profession may have a clearly separate
domain, professions in similar domains generally have all kinds of relationships
with one another. A profession may emerge from another profession; one
profession may dominate another and keep it in a subordinate position as a "subor para- profession," or exert a weaker form of intellectual control over it; a

124. See FREIDSON, supra note 15, at 59-60 ("Occupational control of the division of labor
is a central element of ideal-typical professionalism."); ABBOTT, supranote 107, at 64 (speaking of
the "legally established world ofjurisdiction").
125. As Professor Andrew Abbott notes, "the tenancy of one profession generally excludes
that of another." ABBOTT, supranote 107, at 89.
126.

See SUSSKIND & SUSSKIND, supra note 107, at 22 (providing their own definition of

this bargain).
127. See id.
128. See generallyABBOTT, supra note 107, at 62-63 (discussing differences in government
recognition in Britain, France, and the United States).
129. See id. at 14 (making this point).
130. See generally id. at 59-79.
131. See id. at 62.
132. Seeid at 60-61.
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profession may offer advice about another's domain, as a way of making
inroads into it.133 Professions may also subdivide on the basis of their clients. 13 4
In sum, an analysis of a profession-or of any occupation for that mattershould assume that its situation is dynamic, rather than static, in relationship to
other professions and to occupations that have not yet achieved professional
status.
Another issue that is relevant for professions-and will play a role in the
discussion of the professionalization of compliance-is the social status
associated with a profession. As noted above, 135 scholars have argued that
professions are a method for members of an occupation to acquire economic
value and the social status associated with it. My point here is a more limited
one. It is that the contest among professions (and sub-professions) for
jurisdiction over certain activities will generally have economic and social
consequences. 136 Therefore, those engaged in a particular occupation may find
it useful for economic purposes to be part, or to fall under the umbrella, of a
particular profession rather than another. 137
Admittedly, these features are abstract and not always present in all
professions or aspiring ones. Yet they provide guidelines that compliance can
be measured against in determining whether and how it is a profession. It is to
that task that this Part now turns.
B. Is Compliance a Profession?
It should first be pointed out that there has been little legal academic
literature specifically discussing whether compliance is a profession. Scholars
who write on compliance often assume, without analysis, that it is a profession
in a colloquial sense. For example, Donald Langevoort, who has written
perceptively about compliance and its challenges, assumes the existence of a
compliance profession that is trying to establish itself in organizations. 138
Michele DeStefano, who comprehensively reviewed the compliance field, noted
the existence of a "new profession of compliance" without exploring the bases

133.
134.
135.

See id. at 69-77 (referring to these relationships as "settlements").
See id. at 77-79.
See BLEDSTEIN, supra note 108; LARSON, supra note 108.
See ABBOTT, supra note 107, at 167 (referringto "dominant, oligarchical professions").
See id. at 105 (speaking of the amalgamation of groups and subordinates into a

136.
137.
profession).
138. See Donald C. Langevoort, Getting (Too) Comfortable: In-House Lawyers, Enterprise
Risk, and the Financial Crisis, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 495, 500 (2012) (when discussing the argument
for the separation of legal from compliance, Langevoort perceptively notes that "there is a strong
scent of professional competition here. The fast-developing compliance industry seeks both status
and autonomy in the corporate world, which requires a separation from control by the legal
profession .... ") (footnote omitted). See also id. at 502 (referring to the "compliance profession");
id. at 518 (talking about the "professional autonomy" of the compliance industry).
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for this characterization. 139 John Walsh, a noted practitioner and former
regulator who has written thoughtfully on compliance and who is one of the
foremost authorities on brokerage and investment advisory compliance,
evaluated whether compliance satisfied the "classic" definition of a profession
offered by scholars of professions and concluded that its professional journey is
incomplete. 14
The scholar who has dealt most comprehensively-albeit some twenty
years ago-with compliance as a new profession is Christine Parker.14 1 She
argues that the deregulatory movement, in which regulators encourage firms to
regulate themselves, opened the space in many regulated industries for a new
compliance profession that separated itself from the legal profession. 14 2 She
contends that this new profession is more akin to a management, than a legal,
practice because it is designed to integrate and harmonize legal norms with an
organization's goals and culture, rather than just to make sure that
organizational actors are following the law.143 She also finds that compliance
is characterized by its special connection to regulators because compliance
officers are representing the external, regulatory values in their organization.14 4
In her view, this "dual facing" towards both an organization and regulators
shows the uniqueness of the compliance profession and particularly
distinguishes compliance practitioners from lawyers, who owe loyalty only to
their clients.14 5
Certainly, a case could be made that the compliance occupation satisfies
the prominent professional feature of requiring its practitioners to acquire a
distinct theoretical body of knowledge and the related practical skills to apply
it.14 6 As discussed in Part II, compliance is recognized today as an occupation

139.

See DeStefano, supra note 43, at 91.

140. See, e.g., John H. Walsh, Compliance as a Profession,in MODERN COMPLIANCE: BEST
PRACTICES FOR SECURITIES & FINANCE 765, 776-88 (David H. Lui & John H. Walsh eds., 2015).

See also Baer, Compliance Elites, supra note 102, at 1613 (assuming the existence of a "compliance
profession," albeit where many of its members come from the legal profession).
141.

See Christine Parker, Lawyer Deregulation via Business Deregulation: Compliance

Professionalismand Legal Professionalism,6 INT'L J. LEGAL PRO. 175 (1999). Parker, sometimes

with co-authors, has written extensively on compliance, often highlighting its professional
aspirations and achievements, albeit in Australia. See, e.g., Christine Parker, Compliance
&

Professionalism and Regulatory Community: The Australian Trade PracticesRegime, 26 J.L.

SOC'Y 215 (1999) (discussing, among other things, how regulators can promote compliance
professionalism); Christine Parker & Viebeke Lehmann Nielsen, Do Businesses Take Compliance
Systems Seriously? An Empirical Study of the Implementation of Trade Practices Compliance

Systems in Australia, 30 MELB. U. L. REV. 441 (2006) (discussing, among other things, how the
applicable regulator can enhance trade practice compliance systems).
142.

See Parker, Lawyer Deregulationvia Business Deregulation,supra note 141, at 181.

143.
144.
145.
146.

See id. at 183-86.
See id. at 186-87.
See id. at 188.
See Walsh, supra note 140, at 779-80 (discussing this feature).
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that demands theoretical knowledge that is embodied in an abstract format and
that serves as the foundation for the defined compliance activities (e.g.,
assessing risk of legal violations in an organization and preparing compliance
policies and procedures).14 7 Moreover, a compliance practitioner must learn
and develop certain skills and techniques for appropriately conducting these
activities.148 Practitioners and scholars are developing and enhancing the
theoretical and practical knowledge about compliance, which is evidenced by a
growing number of articles and books on the subject.14 9
However, compliance's satisfaction of this first feature is imperfect.
Much compliance knowledge is basically about laws, regulations, and their
application to a particular organization, arguably knowledge that is within the
domain of the legal profession. Indeed, this is why compliance activities were
initially conducted in legal departments and why today many lawyers serve as
compliance officers.1 5 0 It is true that compliance involves different, albeit
related, skills from those of a practicing organizational lawyer, such as
designing and drafting compliance policies and procedures and the
accompanying training and monitoring.15 1 But, as will be discussed further
below, 15 2 the close relationship between law and compliance complicates
compliance's professional status, and this complication clearly appears in the
question whether compliance's knowledge and skills are distinct.
The professional feature, which is that the acquisition of professional
knowledge and skills occurs in universities, is also not clearly possessed by
compliance. Admittedly, the teaching of basic compliance knowledge and skills
has increasingly become part of the university curriculum. Universities,
particularly in their law and business schools, are offering students courses of
study and degrees in compliance, with the promise and understanding that they
are preparing students for careers in compliance.15 3 The development of the
theoretical knowledge about compliance and the reflection on compliance

147. See supratext accompanying notes 65-89.
148. See COMPLIANCE & LEGAL Div., SEC. INDUS. ASS'N, supra note 67, and accompanying
text (discussing drafting policies and procedures). See also ABBOTT, supra note 107, at 195
(explaining that the modern way of legitimating a profession is through its "scientization or
rationalization of technique and [based] on efficiency of service").
149. Practical information is shared in such publications as COMPLIANCE WEEK and
PRACTICAL COMPLIANCE & RISK MANAGEMENT FOR THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY. Scholars share

information on Compliance.net. The footnotes in this article bear witness to the growing compliance
scholarship.
150. See, e.g., COMPLIANCE & LEGAL Div., SEC. INDUS. ASS'N, supra note 67, at 1
(recounting how, prior to the early 1960s, legal departments generally had responsibility for
compliance in the brokerage industry). See also infra text accompanying notes 175-77.
151. See supra text accompanying notes 65-89.
152. See infra Section V.A.
153. See generally Fanto, supra note 10, at 760-63. See also Pacella, supra note 71, at 950
(discussing these developments).
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practice also occurs in these institutional settings." 4 Certainly, this university
support for compliance is in an embryonic form and is thus not at the level of
established professions: i.e., there are no "compliance schools" like law and
medical schools. Because compliance is a relatively new occupation, it would
not be expected to be completely established in universities at this stage of its
professional development." 5
However, there are some features about compliance's passage into the
university that are troubling from the perspective of professional features. That
compliance teaching often takes place in law schools could suggest that
compliance is a legal activity or a para-professional one associated with, or
under the authority of, the legal profession. Moreover, and significantly from
this perspective, the passage through specific university studies is not-at least
yet-a requirement for compliance practice, as it is for established professions.
People enter the compliance field from diverse backgrounds in many ways,
including from other internal control fields, and they become compliance
officers primarily through "on the job" training.156 This kind of varied and open
formation is characteristic of a technical field, rather than of a profession."
With respect to the professional feature dealing with consciousness of
engaging in a well-defined occupation, compliance officers and practitioners
demonstrate that they are aware of being in and furthering a common
occupation; they increasingly have a professional social identity. 158 This
consciousness and identity are evidenced by the fact that "professional" groups
or societies for compliance officers exist. 159 Not only do these societies have
journals and other publications that promote standard compliance practices and
professional codes of ethics and that develop theoretical and practical
knowledge on compliance, but they also have conventions and other meetings
where compliance practitioners gather to become acquainted and to share with

154.

To cite one example, there is the Programon CorporateCompliance and Enforcement

at NYU School of Law, N.Y.U. SCH. OF L., https://www.law.nyu.edu/centers/corporatecompliance
(last visited Dec. 10, 2020).
155. See Walsh, supra note 140, at 782 (discussing compliance training conducted in
universities).
156. See Lui, supra note 80, at 130 (making this point but noting that many compliance
officers come from a legal background).
157. See FREIDSON, supra note 15, at 90 (discussing how certain "technical" occupations
have an "ambiguous and unstable" position in the labor market).
158. On social identity, see Michael A. Hogg & Dominic Abrams, SocialIdentity and Social
Cognition: Historical Background and Current Trends, in SOCIAL IDENTITY AND SOCIAL
COGNITION: AN INTRODUCTION 8-12 (Dominic Abrams & Michael A. Hogg eds., 1999) (i.e., the
self-definition as a group member that affects a person's perceptions).
159. See,
e.g.,
SOC'Y
OF
CORP.
COMPLIANCE
&
ETHICS,
https://www.corporatecompliance.org (last visited Sept. 10, 2020); NAT'L SOC'Y OF COMPLIANCE

PROS., https://nscp.org (last visited Dec. 10, 2020).
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each other their knowledge and skills.160 These meetings enhance and foster the
social identity of compliance practitioners. In addition, through the resources
of these societies, compliance positions are advertised,161 which shows that
compliance practitioners can have a compliance career where they move from
organization to organization, including to firms composed of only compliance
practitioners, ratherthan having their employing organization alone define their
work identity.1 6 2 In other words, this occupational mobility for compliance
officers shows that the job of compliance has become distinct from its
organizational setting, which is generally a necessary professional feature.16 3
However, compliance does not possess the most distinguishing feature of
established professions: the authority and monopoly of practice given by the
government, generally through a state licensing regime, to professionals to
control their occupation, particularly to determine who can engage in it, and to
separate and distinguish it from other activities. In other words, there has been
no "grand bargain" between the government and compliance practitioners.164
There has been no concerted movement by compliance practitioners to obtain
this authority over their field, which would empower them to have the exclusive
right to train those who wish to enter the compliance "profession." 16 5 Indeed,
anybody is free to practice compliance or to hold himself or herself out as a
compliance officer, consultant, or specialist, without any objection from the
"true" compliance officers recognized by a state licensing regime. Moreover,
organizations can make anyone they choose a compliance officer or even the
head of compliance-something that would not be allowed for a general counsel
position. The federal government, through its regulators, may require that a
certain kind of organization have a chief compliance officer, 166 but it does not
require that only those with specific educational credentials be eligible for that
position or for other compliance officer roles. Regulators even allow someone
with another position in an organization also to act as a compliance officer.167
Significantly, no state government requires the licensing of compliance officers.

160.

See,

e.g.,

All

Conferences,

SOC'Y

OF

CORP.

COMPLIANCE

&

ETHICS,

https://www.corporatecompliance.org/all-conferences (last visited Dec. 10, 2020).
161. See,
e.g.,
All
Jobs, SOC'Y OF CORP.
COMPLIANCE
&
ETHICS,
https://www.corporatecompliance.org/all-jobs (last visited Dec. 10, 2020).
162. See FREIDSON, supra note 15, at 76 (explaining how this inter-organization movement
characterizes professional control).
163. See id. (explaining that a profession transcends bureaucratic control, where the
organization defines the position and the nature of its work).
164. See SUSSKIND & SUSSKIND, supra note 107, at 22.
165. See Walsh, supra note 140, at 787-88. See also id. at 788-94 (Walsh appears to suggest
that, if compliance practitioners keep acting as separate professionals and promote standards and
ethical codes for compliance practice, the government recognition will eventually come).
166. See supra text accompanying notes 46-50.
167. This is shown by regulatory pronouncements stating that compliance officers can fulfill
other organizational duties. See, e.g., Publication of the OIG Compliance Program Guidance for
Hospitals, supra note 47, 63 Fed. Reg. at 8993 ("Every hospital should designate a compliance
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Certainly, it may be unfair to expect the relatively young occupation of
compliance to have achieved this professional feature, which is granted to an
incipient profession only after its practitioners spend considerable time and
lobbying efforts to persuade state legislatures. 168 But, as will be discussed
below, states have few incentives to grant compliance this monopoly of
practice, and the federal government has reasons to prefer this status quo. 169
This government situation thus presents compliance with an important
impediment to the attainment of this critical professional feature.
Compliance must also establish itself within-to use Abbott's words-the
system of professions and related occupations. It must take jurisdiction over a
given domain or domains, whether they are occupied or not by an existing
profession, and hold them against encroachments by other professions or
domains looking to occupy or re-occupy them.170
Clearly, as Parker
perceptively observes, compliance established itself as an occupation or set of
tasks distinct from legal practice in response to governmental pressure for
organizations to regulate themselves.171
From a systems perspective,
compliance thus occupied a new jurisdiction that was at the periphery of the
legal profession's "heartland."1 7 2 But, as will be discussed in detail below,
compliance's relationship to the legal profession is complex and dynamic,
jurisdictional issues are far from being resolved, and the outcome of the
relationship implicates issues of social status. 173 Moreover, this relationship
may prevent compliance from achieving full professional status. In other
words, compliance is still enmeshed in a struggle to define its place in the
professional system.
The above discussion of compliance's incomplete professional status
demands further analysis of the reasons, such as its relationship to the legal
profession, that have contributed to this state of affairs. This analysis may also

officer to serve as the focal point for compliance activities. This responsibility may be the
individual's sole duty or added to other management responsibilities, depending upon the size and
resources of the hospital and the complexity of the task."); Compliance Programs of Investment
Companies and Investment Advisers, 68 Fed. Reg. 74714, 74725 n.109 (Dec. 24, 2003) (stating
SEC's awareness that small investment advisers need not hire a separate chief compliance officer).
168. See LARSON, supra note 108, at 66-79 (discussing the lengthy procedures involved in
how established professions achieved the government-granted monopoly of practice). Abbott
explains that this government recognition often follows from public recognition of the necessity of
a given profession. See ABBOTT, supra note 107, at 59-69. Compliance may also suffer because its
practitioners do not interact directly with the public, which may demand that they be treated only
by professionals.
169. See infra text accompanying note 206.
170. See ABBOTT, supranote 107, at 87 ("Of the various exclusive properties of professions,
jurisdiction is the most important.").
171.

See Parker, Lawyer Deregulationvia Business Deregulation,supra note 141, at 181.

172. See ABBOTT, supra note 107, at 71 ("Every profession aims for a heartland of work
over which it has complete, legally established control.").
173. See infra text accompanying notes 174-202.
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provide a view on compliance's future as a profession. It is to this analysis that
the next Part is devoted.
III. EXPLORATION OF THE REASONS FOR THE CURRENT PROFESSIONAL STATUS
OF COMPLIANCE

Part III explores, in order of their importance, four central reasons for the
current incomplete and uncertain professional status of compliance. These are
(i) the complicated relationship between compliance and the established legal
profession, (ii) the fact that the federal government through regulators and
enforcement officials appears to favor a weak professional status for
compliance, (iii) claims by organizational and management scholars that
challenge the legal orientation of compliance and that contend that compliance
should receive its theoretical underpinning from them, and (iv) the disruptive
effects of technology upon compliance practice.
A. The ComplicatedRelationship Between Compliance and the Legal
Profession
A primary reason for the incomplete and uncertain professional status of
compliance is its complex relationship with the established legal profession.
That compliance is closely connected to the legal profession is not surprising
because compliance emerged from the legal department in organizations.7 4
Historically, a major task of inside counsel in organizations was "preventive
law," the legal process designed to ensure that employees and other agents
complied with law and regulation in conducting organizational activities."
However, preventive law is just another name for compliance. Indeed, the
National Center for Preventive Law, an organization composed of general
counsel and other organizational lawyers, wrote an early codification of
compliance principles.17 6 The close connection between the legal profession
and compliance is still evidenced by the fact that in many organizations the
general counsel also serves as the CCO or is the person to whom the CCO
directly reports. 77
Moreover, because doing at least some of the major compliance tasks is
arguably engaging in legal or law-related activities,178 the legal profession has
not relinquished its control over the compliance field, even while the latter

174.

See supranote 150 and accompanying text.

175. See Robert Eli Rosen, The Inside Counsel Movement, ProfessionalJudgement and
OrganizationalRepresentation, 64 IND. L.J. 479, 522 (1989).
176.

See NAT'L CTR. FOR PREVENTIVE LAW, CORPORATE COMPLIANCE PRINCIPLES (1996).

177.

See LRN, THE 2015 ETHICS AND COMPLIANCE EFFECTIVENESS REPORT 7-8 (2015)

(showing that, collectively, chief compliance officers report more often to others, such as the audit
committee and the chief executive officer, rather than to the general counsel, although the latter
remains the largest single reporting line).
178. See supra text accompanying notes 66-71.
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increasingly became a distinct organizational function.17 9 Ina rich debate about
the relationship between compliance and the law, general counsel-and their
supporters in the academy-reason, on the basis of the legal aspects of
compliance, that compliance should be subject to the authority of the legal
department in organizations and that the CCO should report to the general
counsel (if there is a standalone CCO position). 180 They justify this assertion of
authority, among other things, by the argument that the legal interpretations and
other related legal work of compliance officers are subject to the judgment and
authority of the general counsel and the organization's legal staff.181 This
assertion might even make sense to and be accepted by compliance officers,
many of whom were trained and practiced as lawyers.
In fact, the American Law Institute's ongoing project on compliance could
be seen as a good, recent example of the legal profession's continued exercise
of authority over the compliance field.182 In the project, the Institute, an
authoritative organization composed of judges, practicing lawyers, and legal
scholars and engaged in the standardization of the law,18 3 sets forth the
"principles" of compliance for organizations. These principles provide the
elements of compliance (i.e., what compliance officers do) and the compliance
roles of the various organizational actors, including the CCO and the
compliance officers (i.e., compliance governance). 184 This articulation of legal

179. See Dana A. Remus, Out of Practice: The Twenty-First-CenturyLegal Profession,63
DUKE L.J. 1243, 1259-61 (2014) (discussing how the bar never took clear control of fields like
compliance nor clearly excluded them).
180. For one general counsel's perspective, see Ben W. Heineman, Jr., Don't Divorce the
GC and Compliance Officer, CORP. COUNSEL, Jan. 2011, at 48. For representative academic views
supportive of the general counsel, see DeStefano, supra note 43, at 98-101 (discussing general
counsel authority over compliance); id. at 120-55 (comprehensively covering arguments for and
against legal department control of compliance); Robert C. Bird & Stephen Kim Park, The Domains
of CorporateCounsel in an Era of Compliance, 53 AM. BUS. L.J. 203, 204-05 (2016) (recognizing

the assertion of authority by general counsel over compliance and arguing for certain involvement
by them in the compliance function); Tanina Rostain, General Counsel in the Age of Compliance:
PreliminaryFindings and New Research Questions, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 465, 473-77, 481

(2008) (presenting general counsel survey data regarding their overall control over compliance).
181. See Heineman, supra note 180, at 48; DeStefano, supra note 43, at 144-55 (critically
explaining the expansive role of corporate counsel in promoting law and ethics and problems arising
from separating counsel from compliance).
182.

See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW: COMPLIANCE, RISK MANAGEMENT, AND ENFORCEMENT,

supra note 90. The author is an associate reporter on this project who is responsible for the drafting
of chapter three on governance of compliance and risk management.
183. As its website explains, "The American Law Institute is the leading independent
organization in the United States producing scholarly work to clarify, modernize, and otherwise
improve the law." See About ALL, AM. L. INST., https://www.ali.org/about-ali (last visited Dec. 10,
2020).

184.

Chapter 3 of the Principles set forth those dealing with governance; Chapter 5 outlines

those discussing compliance. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW: COMPLIANCE, RISK MANAGEMENT,
AND ENFORCEMENT (AM. L. INST., Tentative Draft No. 1, 2019).
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principles of compliance practice makes sense only if the legal profession
believes-or is willing to take the position-that the subject matter of
compliance falls within its domain or authority. 18 5
As scholars have pointed out, however, the legal profession has not clearly
asserted its authority over occupations like compliance that operate in the
shadow of the law. 18 6 The practice of compliance, as it occurs in organizations
today, 187 could be seen to be close to, but not squarely within, the practice of
the law or the provision of legal services. 188 That is, compliance officers, many
of whom are lawyers, may be viewed as offering legal advice to organizational
actors whether through the policies and procedures that they draft or through
their interpretation of these policies and procedures in particular
circumstances. 189 As Professor Jennifer Pacella has explained at length, this
kind of activity might well fall within the definition of "law-related services"
that are defined in the American Bar Association's Model Rule 5.7.190 Yet, as
she also explains and as will be discussed more below, commentary to the Rule
does not list compliance as one of the "law-related services" and the wording of
the Rule does not clearly cover compliance officers (whether lawyers or
otherwise) providing services individually and not in connection with lawyers
who are providing legal services. 191 Despite this uncertainty as to how
compliance exactly fits within the canons of legal practice, the legal profession
through its state bar associations has generally not put any impediments in the

185. On the project page, the Institute says the following: "This project will address the need
for a set of recommended standards and best practices on the law of compliance and risk
management."

See

PRINCIPLES

OF

THE LAW:

COMPLIANCE,

RISK

MANAGEMENT,

AND

ENFORCEMENT (AM. L. INST., Tentative Draft No. 1, 2019), https://www.ali.org/projects/show/co

mpliance-enforcement-and-risk-management-corporations-nonprofits-and-other-organizations
(last visited Dec. 10, 2020).
186.

See Tanina Rostain, The Emergence of "Law Consultants," 75 FORDHAM L. REV.

1397, 1407-11 (2006) (discussing how lawyers and others avoid the reach of the legal profession
by engaging in consulting practices where practitioners do not provide their clients with legal
opinions or legal representation).
187. See supra Section I.C.
188. As Professor Pacella has explained, the definition of the practice of law and the
provision of legal services has been left to the individual states to define, and their definitions focus
on the application of legal judgment and on litigation-related services. See Pacella, supra note 71,
at 963-69.
189. See id. at 970-71 (discussion of how compliance officers provide legal advice).
190. See id. at 970 (making this argument and citing to Rule 5.7(b), which explains that such
services "denote[] services that might reasonably be performed in conjunction with and in substance
are related to the provision of legal services, and that are not prohibited as unauthorized practice of
law when provided by a non-lawyer.") (quoting MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 5.7(b) (AM.
BAR. ASS'N 1983)).

191. See id. at 970-73 (also explaining that the original purpose of the provision was to
address the situation where lawyers provided ancillary services or businesses as part of their law
practice).
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way of lawyers (and others) engaging in compliance activities, so long as they
do not hold themselves out as being engaged in legal practice. 19 2
Scholars have offered various explanations for the above ambivalence of
the legal profession in asserting its authority over compliance. One explanation
is that the legal profession is reluctant to do this in situations where
organizations need legal advice and direction that must be given in complex
organizational settings. That is, organizations need legal guidance that has to
be fully integrated into their operations and that takes into account a range of
constraints, including business strategy, accounting, finance, and technology.
Compliance is this kind of integrated law-related service because for it to
function well it must be part of the operations of an organization. 193 From this
perspective, the legal profession has generally taken a "hands-off' approach to
compliance so that compliance can develop as a useful law-related (but not
legal) service provided by lawyers and others to organizations.
A more critical perspective on this situation would contend that the legal
profession not asserting authority over compliance allows lawyers acting as
compliance officers to serve purely organizational interests without being
subject to professional oversight. 194 This view is related to the claim that
organizations (particularly large business firms) increasingly incorporate
professionals whose services they need into an organization's hierarchy and
disassociate them from their respective profession. 195 Thus, according to this
perspective, pushed by their business firm clients, the legal profession accepts
limited authority over compliance just as, in an earlier period, it permitted
organizations to control their inside counsel.196

192. See id. at 987-89 (explaining that there have been no cases involving compliance
officers and applying state versions of Rule 5.7 but noting that there is a risk of such a rule violation
to a lawyer acting as a compliance officer). See also Rostain, supra note 186, at 1408 (discussing
how few cases targeted people in the position of compliance officers). The American Bar
Association even published a book on compliance in which the authors focus on practical tasks of
compliance officers and do not squarely address the officers' professional status as lawyers. See
ANDREW S. BOUTROS, ET AL., THE ABA COMPLIANCE OFFICER'S DESKBOOK (2017).

193. See Rostain, supra note 186, at 1420-25 (discussing the advantages of this law-related
consulting in organizations).
194. See Remus, supranote 179, at 1269-70 ("The proliferation of quasi-legal roles allows
corporate management to expand its strategic access to legal expertise under a greater range of
conditions and subject to fewer constraints.").
195. See FREIDSON, supranote 15, at 210 ("Employing organizations are likely to intensify
efforts to standardize the work of rank-and-file professionals in order to reduce their cost and better
control and supervise them.").
196. Control may be too strong a word. Inside counsel become part of the politics of an
organization, rather than external professionals with no stake in it. See Rosen, supra note 175, at
536 ("[L]awyers influence not only corporate actions to comply with the law, but also corporate
goals and commitments beyond the law's dictates."). Professor Dana Remus suggests that
organizations have more control over their compliance officers than their legal counsel. See Remus,
Out of Practice, supranote 179, at 1270 ("If compliance officers are located outside of the general
counsel's office, management derives the benefits of a lawyer's expertise and reputational capital
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Several explicitly professionalism "stories" could be added to, and could
even incorporate parts of, the above explanations of the legal profession's
relationship to compliance. Although, as discussed above, compliance emerged
out of legal practice as an important organizational function, the legal profession
has little incentive to assert more than a general authority over it. In other
words, so long as the legal profession's ultimate authority over the law-its
heartland-is recognized and undisputed, it might allow compliance to co-exist
as a subsidiary, satellite occupation or a "sub-profession" to legal practice. 197
The legal profession might even benefit in status by keeping compliance both
under its authority and distinguished from it because compliance involves
routinized, organizational law-related activities, such as drafting procedures and
monitoring. 198 Therefore, one professional story for compliance is that it has
developed, and will likely remain, as a sub-profession to the legal profession
where compliance practitioners work almost exclusively in organizations. This
story suggests that compliance will not acquire all the features of a strong
profession, particularly the government-awarded monopoly of control over its
activities, unless it becomes entirely incorporated into the legal profession.
Yet a more positive professional story of the relationship between law and
compliance could be offered. Under it, compliance practitioners, whether
lawyers or others, saw the growing need for their services in organizations and
the opportunity to develop them outside legal departments, which did not
strongly oppose this development. These practitioners have been able to
convince organizations of the need for and the importance of the compliance
function, in light of the internalization of enforcement, 199 and achieved the
organizational role and identity discussed above. 200 Rather than being content
to remain within the orbit of, or to be an ancillary occupation to, the legal
profession, compliance practitioners are asserting their professional
independence and status. They increasingly highlight the difference between
their activities, on the one hand, and the practice of law on the other. In Abbott's
words, a new collection of activities or "jurisdiction" has emerged in
compliance; the legal profession has ceded it to compliance practitioners (many

in the compliance role while ceding far less control than if the lawyer-compliance officer was
subject to professional regulation.") (footnote omitted).
197. See ABBOTT, supra note 107, at 71 (discussing the professional phenomenon of one
occupation being subordinate to a profession, such as in the doctor-nursing relationship). That is,
doctors have the ultimate authority, in medical treatment, over nurses and nurse practitioners but
allow them a certain freedom of practice.
198. See id. at 125-28 (discussing the consequences of the routinization and degradation of
profession work). Abbott explains that this can result in a subordinate profession or in stratification
within the profession. See id. at 127-28. The stratification can also arise in situations where a
demand for professional services decreases, which relegates lower status professionals to
quasi-professional roles. See id. at 119. Certainly, the increased hiring of lawyers in compliance
roles could reflect their failure to find places in higher status law firms.
199. See id. at 91 (as he notes, "tasks usually antedate groups").
200. See supra Section I.C.1.
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of whom are lawyers); and the practitioners are resisting any reassertion of
control by the legal profession by trying to establish their own independent
profession. 201 This kind of emergence of one profession out of another because
of new work that becomes the new profession's jurisdiction is common in the
history of professions. 20 2
Yet whatever is the professional story of the legal profession's relationship
to compliance, the relationship has prevented the straightforward transition of
compliance into a strong profession and contributes to compliance's uncertain
professional status. This relationship, however, is not the only reason for
compliance's professional situation, because the government has a hand in it as
well.
B. The FederalGovernment's Use of Compliance
The federal government, whether through the actions and pronouncements
of regulators or enforcement officials, has also contributed to the uncertain
professional status of compliance officers because it has an interest in their not
being members of a "strong" profession. 203 Not surprisingly then, it has not
advocated for the professionalization of compliance officers. As noted earlier,
the federal government mandated or encouraged organizations to have
compliance as part of their internal control, which is an internalization in
organizations of external or government control. 204 Compliance officers are
thus organizational actors who have been "deputized" to act for regulators and
enforcement officials in their organization. In this they serve the federal
government's purposes and have a quasi-governmental role. 2 5
Juxtaposed with this anti-professional stance on the part of federal
government officials is the indifference of the state government towards
licensing compliance officers. This indifference is not surprising. In the history
of professions, state licensing would appear when the state legislature accepts
that the public must be protected by having only knowledgeable practitioners
exercise a particular occupation. State legislatures arrive at this conclusion
because they would perceive that the task performed by the occupation is central

201. See ABBOTT, supra note 107, at 64 ("In the workplace, jurisdiction is a simple claim to
control certain kinds of work.").
202. Abbott discusses ways in which a new profession emerges, many of which could well
apply to compliance. For example, he discusses the phenomenon of "enclosure." See, e.g., id. at 95
("Typically, there emerge specialties in several professions, performing similar sorts of work but
retaining their original allegiance. Eventually these groups make common cause and consider
forming a new profession, enclosing their common work as a single jurisdiction independent of
their parents."). Arguably, compliance today has specialists from law, accounting, and systems
analysis who are banding together as members of a new profession.
203. For simplicity's sake, the term "federal government" will be used interchangeably with
"regulators" and "enforcement officials."
204. See supratext accompanying notes 46-49.
205. See supratext accompanying notes 33-36.
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to public welfare in some respect and because the practitioners, aided by the
public and the media, convince them that the occupation must be restricted to
these knowledgeable practitioners to ensure this welfare. But there has been no
public "movement" directed at state legislatures and organized by compliance
practitioners to have the practice of compliance require a state license that these
practitioners control. This may well be because the harm to consumers from
having unlicensed persons act as compliance officers in organizations is not
evident or direct. Thus, it is not surprising that supporters of compliance have
not lobbied state legislatures for the professional license privilege, given how
difficult it might be for them to persuade legislators of the direct public benefit
from the licensing regime. 206
The weak and undefined professional status of compliance officers that
follows from the absence of state licensing allows the federal government more
freedom to use them for its own purposes than would be the case if compliance
officers were members of an established profession. This government, rather
than a profession, establishes the duties and tasks of compliance officers. 207
Because compliance officers are its "eyes and ears," a regulator expects them to
report regularly to it on what is occurring within their organization. 208
Regulators also use compliance officers for specific, and changing, government
purposes. 209 This kind of control, which involves dictating the scope of
compliance's work, undermines its professional status because professionals
generally have control over their work.2 10 Indeed, that regulations do not

206. And the revenue stream from licenses, which might be attractive to legislators, might
not be that large as well, or large enough to motivate them. I owe this observation to Professor Baer.
207. See supratext accompanying notes 65-89 (on these duties).
208. See supratext accompanying notes 82-84. As Professor Baer has argued, government
enforcement officials prefer this model of compliance officer as police officer, helping them prevent
and detect organizational wrongdoers. See Baer, Confronting the Two Faces of CorporateFraud,
supra note 75, at 148-50. This policing model of compliance runs counter to what Professor Baer
characterizes as an "architectural approach," pursuant to which a compliance officer designs
structures with the purpose of encouraging compliance by organizational actors. See id. at 133. Her
architectural approach is akin to that followed by a professional in the classic sense, who exercises
discretion and judgment on a given subject matter as applied to a particular situation.
209. A good example of this in the brokerage industry is that each year, the SEC and FINRA
set forth priorities for their examinations. See, e.g., SEC. AND EXCH. COMM'N, 2020 EXAMINATION
PRIORITIES: OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE INSPECTIONS AND EXAMINATIONS 1 (2020) ("As a threshold

matter, we would like to emphasize that compliance programs, chief compliance officers, and other
compliance staff play critically important roles at firms."); FIN. INDUS. REGUL. AUTH., INC., 2020
RISK MONITORING AND EXAMINATION PRIORITIES LETTER 1 (2020) ("[T]he letter includes a list of
practical considerations and questions for each of the highlighted topics, which firms may use to
evaluate the state of their compliance, supervisory and risk management programs."). These are,
among other things, messages to compliance officers about the areas and concerns that the
regulators would like compliance officers to make sure that their firms address.
210. See supra text accompanying note 124. Admittedly, the history of professions shows
that the government occasionally circumscribes or limits their power so that they serve its purposes.
See ABBOTT, supra note 107, at 141 (discussing the government's control over the medical
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require any particular training or education for the compliance officer roleand specifically allow anyone to be a compliance officer-contributes to this
weak professional status of the field. 21 1 While regulators are protective of
compliance officers, 212 they also punish them harshly when an officer is
perceived not to be appropriately serving government interests by completing
compliance tasks. 213
If compliance officers were recognized professionals-say, for example,
members of the legal profession-they could further the federal government's
interests in preventing and detecting legal violations, but they would also be
subject to the canons or guidelines of their profession. This professional status
and the expected professional conduct would insulate them from government
pressure and allow them to exercise their discretion in their work and follow
their professional judgment instead of the direction of regulators or enforcement
officials. For example, a lawyer is supposed to serve the public interest; this
professional purpose is a justification for the lawyer's professional status. 214
Yet the lawyer's professional relationship with and loyalty to his or her
organizational client also affects how he or she satisfies the public interest. 215
By contrast, a compliance officer has no professional status and purposes to use
as a bulwark against the government's control over the officer's services.
In fact, the real struggle involving the control over and role of compliance
officers is not between the federal government through its regulators and
enforcement officials and an incipient compliance profession, but between the
government and the organizations in which they work. In organizational theory
parlance, this is a contest over the bureaucratic-not professional-control of
compliance officers. 216 Regulators and enforcement officials try to make

profession). Indeed, while granting a profession its external support for the profession's monopoly
of practice, the government also uses the profession in the service of its own values and pushes the
profession to adopt its own bureaucratic division of labor versus the focus on expertise typical of a
profession. See id. at 172-73.
211. See supra text accompanying notes 98-102. That is, the federal government may
require the compliance officer position and specify its duties, but it does not require that the officer
be a member of the compliance "profession." It allows those with other operational responsibilities
to fulfill the compliance officer role. Indeed, there are anecdotal reports that regulators prefer
compliance officers not to be lawyers, i.e., not to be members of a strong profession.
212. See, e.g., Public Statement, Luis A. Aguilar, Comm'r, Sec. and Exch. Comm'n, "The
Role of Chief Compliance
Officers Must Be Supported" (June 29, 2015),
https://www.sec.gov/news/statement/supporting-role-of-chief-compliance-officers.html
(discussing, among other things, the SEC's support for compliance officers).
213. See generally Golumbic, supra note 25, at 51-69 (surveying prominent cases against
compliance officers).
214. See LARSON, supra note 108, at 172-73 (discussing how the promoters of the legal
profession in the 1910-1930s publicized their public interest side).
215. See Remus, Out ofPractice, supra note 179, at 1250 (discussing the traditional model
of the legal canons where the lawyer balances the interests of the client and the state).
216. See FREIDSON, supra note 15, at 48-51 (discussing the bureaucratic division of labor).
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compliance officers serve their purposes as much as possible. That is, regulators
contest with organizations the position and activities of an organization's
compliance officers because, understandably, an organization also places these
officers within its own hierarchy and wants them to serve organizational
purposes. But in this struggle over which bureaucracy-whether a federal
regulator or an employing organization-has the dominance over compliance
officers, the professionalization of compliance is undermined and ignored. A
compliance profession would protect compliance officers from being
completely subsumed by this bureaucratic control, whether by their
organization or by the applicable regulator.
So, government efforts to control compliance officers, just as the
relationship between the legal profession and compliance, contribute to
There are several other
compliance's uncertain professional status.
developments that also arguably impede compliance's professional status, to
which this Part now turns.
C. Other Disciplines as an Intellectual Foundationfor Compliance
Not only has the legal profession been ambivalent about embracing
compliance-with federal government acquiescence in this ambivalence-but
scholars from other intellectual disciplines, and even some compliance
practitioners, argue against the alignment of compliance with the law. They
have criticized the legal orientation of compliance, preferring to base it on other
intellectual foundations.21
They contend that a purely legally-oriented
compliance will have limited effectiveness in deterring violations of the law.
From the scholarly side, organizational and business ethics scholars argue
that compliance should have a different foundation from the law. 218 On the
basis of their research, they contend that compliance is most effective when it
fosters ethical decision-making and an ethical culture in an organization, rather
than focusing primarily on legal compliance. 219 In fact, in their view, the

217. See, e.g., Christine E. Parker et al., The Two Faces ofLawyers: ProfessionalEthics and
Business Compliance with Regulation, 22 GEO. J. LEG. ETHICS 201, 205 (2009) ("Our data suggest

that to the extent lawyers influence clients, it is towards game-playing, not commitment to
compliance or resistance to compliance.").
218. See Gary R. Weaver & Linda Klebe Trevino, Compliance and Values OrientedEthics
Programs:Influences on Employees'Attitudesand Behavior, 9 BUS. ETHICS Q. 315 (1999) (finding

that a values orientation is more effective than a legal orientation in compliance); Christine Parker
& Vibeke Lehmann Nielsen, Introduction: From Regulation to Compliance, in EXPLAINING
COMPLIANCE: BUSINESS RESPONSES TO REGULATION 1, 11-14 (Christine Parker & Vibeke

Lehmann Nielsen eds., 2011) (discussing the normative motives for compliance). See also Todd
Haugh, Nudging Corporate Compliance, 54 AM. BUS. L.J. 683, 686 (2017) (explaining how
"behavioral ethics nudging" may make employees engage in more compliance conduct).
219. See, e.g., Tenbrunsel et al., supra note 13, at 293-96 (explaining how organizational
climates for ethics, respect, and procedural justice support an organization's ethical infrastructural
and formal systems of conduct); Linda Klebe Trevino et al., Legitimating the Legitimate: A
Grounded Theory Study of Legitimacy Work Among Ethics and Compliance Officers, 123
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emphasis on legal compliance can "crowd out" an ethical orientation that would
lead employees otherwise to try to do the "right thing" in a given situation,
rather thanjust complying with the letter of the law. From their perspective, the
goal of compliance should be to foster an ethical culture that will be the
foundation for legal compliance.2 20 Unethical culture for them can lead to
noncompliance and destructive organizational problems. It should be noted that
several of these scholars, such as Christine Parker, are in countries outside the
United States where compliance does not have the strong association with and
origin in the legal profession as it does in this country.2 1
Practicing compliance officers have echoed this assertion about the
importance of an ethical culture-with less focus on law.222 These practitioners
insist upon using the title of "Chief Ethics and Compliance Officer," which
emphasizes the aspect of their position that promotes a firm's ethical culture. 2 23
Like the scholars whose work they draw upon, they, too, see ethics as the
foundation for a compliant organization.22 4 They thus seek to develop and to
share practices that promote ethical conduct and "good" culture in an
organization.22 5
This scholarly and practical alternative to the legal orientation of
compliance also has consequences for its professionalization because it offers a
different professional outcome than that compliance be integrated with, or
become a subservient discipline to, the legal profession. From a professional
formation perspective, the study of compliance and the preparation of future
compliance officers would occur in business, not law, schools and compliance

ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 186, 194-95 (2014) (discussing the legal

mindset that impedes the fostering of ethics in an organization). But see Donald C. Langevoort,
Cultures of Compliance, 54 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 933, 966-967 (2017) (emphasizing the individual
and institutional pressures that run counter to the establishment of an ethical culture in
organizations).
220. See, e.g., Hess, supra note 59, at 351-55 (arguing for a nuanced view that recognizes
the complexities involved in the relationship between extrinsic (often legal) and intrinsic (ethical)
motivations for compliance).
221. See List of Contributors to Christine Parker & Vibeke Lehmann Nielsen, supra note
218, at xii (Parker's biography).
222.

See Christine Parker, The Ethics ofAdvising on Regulatory Compliance:Autonomy or

Interdependence?, 28 J. BUS. ETHICS. 339, 342-45 (2000) (describing, on the basis of interviews,
compliance officers' view of themselves as distinct from lawyers and fostering firm culture and
ethics).
223.

See, e.g., ETHICS RES. CTR., LEADING CORPORATE INTEGRITY: DEFINING THE ROLE OF

THE CHIEF ETHICS & COMPLIANCE OFFICER (CECO) 18 (2007).
224. See, e.g., Joseph E. Murphy, Policies in Conflict: Undermining Corporate
Self-Policing, 69 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 421, 425 (2017) (making this point).
225. See, e.g., Lee Augsburger, How Compliance Can Teach Ethics, in MODERN
COMPLIANCE: BEST PRACTICES FOR SECURITIES & FINANCE 179, 185-89 (David H. Lui & John H.

Walsh eds., 2015) (discussing practices for effective ethics programs in financial firms).
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would be a specialty in management and business administration.226 Its
intellectual foundation would rest upon disciplines associated with those
schools, like organizational studies, business ethics, and social psychology. 227
The separate departmentalization of compliance in business organizations, with
all that it entails (e.g., making the CCO a position separate from the chief legal
officer), would reinforce compliance's distinct professional position apart from
the law.
More will be said in the next Part about the outcome of this contest
between fields for the jurisdiction of compliance. Certainly, the history of
professions is full of examples of professions opposing others when expanding
into a new occupation. 228 My point here is that the struggle between the legal
profession and management studies over compliance contributes to the field's
uncertain professional status by arguably pulling it in different professional
directions. That is, having another theoretical and practical orientation, with
strong advocates, prevents compliance from stabilizing within the orbit of the
legal profession and thus keeps its professional status in flux. Although the
influence of managerial and organizational studies may enable compliance to
establish itself as a standalone profession separate from the law, this is likely to
occur only if the legal profession completely relinquishes its influence over
compliance, which, as discussed above and furtherbelow, does not seem likely.
In sum, the ethical and managerial orientation of compliance contributes
to its uncertain professional status. This is also true of the final reason that this
part explores: the place of technology in compliance's operation within
organizations.
D. The Disruptive Force of Technology in Compliance
That technology is influencing, and even disrupting, compliance practice
today also contributes to compliance's uncertain professional status.
Compliance has always had a close relationship with technology because it was
originally a "back office" function in industries like finance whose operations
depended upon their communications and other technology. 229 Compliance
practitioners were intimately familiar with their firm's operations, which is why
they were well positioned to make sure that the operations were done in

226.

See,

e.g.,

Ethics

and

Compliance,

MIAMI

HERBERT

BUS.

SCH.,

https://www.bus.miami.edu/our-perspective/ethics-compliance/index.html
(last visited Dec. 10,
2020) (discussing University of Miami's ethics program in its business school).
227. See infra Section IILA.
228. See ABBOTT, supra note 107, at 91 ("External forces directly disturb the system by
opening new task areas for jurisdiction and by destroying old jurisdictions. A new task appears, and
some profession achieves jurisdiction over it .... ").
229. See John H. Walsh, A History of Compliance, in MODERN COMPLIANCE: BEST
PRACTICES FOR SECURITIES & FINANCE 5, 13-19 (David H. Lui & John H. Walsh eds., 2015)

(discussing how compliance in the securities industry fell from senior management to those lower
in the institutional hierarchy).
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accordance with law and regulation. For example, a compliance officer of a
broker-dealer had to understand how customer stock trades were communicated
and processed so as to be able to ensure that they were done in conformity with
the regulation of trading. 230 Even today when compliance practice demands
increasing "legal" knowledge, it still draws practitioners from an organization's
management of operations, which is heavily involved with information

technology. 231
The influence of technology on compliance is even more direct than the
fact that compliance practitioners have to understand well the operations of
organizations, including its technology. Technology is now being used in and
is shaping many of the main compliance tasks.23 2 As discussed above,
compliance practitioners establish policies and procedures for an organization's
employees, train them in these forms of guidance, monitor their compliance and
regularly test the compliance systems. 233 Many of these compliance tasks are
increasingly being automated or otherwise assisted by technological means. 23 4
If, for example, a compliance officer has to monitor employee communications
and activities outside the organization-which certain regulatory schemes
require235-it would be difficult and time-consuming if the compliance officer
did not have the use of certain software that could look over the communications
or could not do web searches on the employees and, say, highlight problematic
emails or outside activities for the officer's further review. 23 6 Indeed,
increasingly compliance practitioners are expected to be skilled in or conversant
with the technology enabling this automation and associated data analysis,
which is known as "Regtech." 2 3 7
230.

See
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BROKER-DEALER COMPLIANCE PROGRAM 34 (1974) (explaining supervision of customer trading

in early broker-dealer compliance manual).
231. After all, the International Standard's guidelines on compliance are entitled
"compliance management systems." See INT'L ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION, supra note 12.
232. For these tasks, see supra Section I.C.i. For a comprehensive account of the use of
technology in compliance, albeit with an emphasis on technology in risk management, see Kenneth
A. Bamberger, Technologies of Compliance:Risk and Regulation in a DigitalAge, 88 TEX. L. REV.
669 (2010).
233. See text accompanying notes 67-78.
234. See generally James A. Fanto, DashboardCompliance: Benefit, Threat, or Both?, 11
BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 1 (2016) (discussing this process); Bamberger, supra note 232, at
683-702 (explaining how many compliance tasks have necessarily become automated and how this
process reflects a new regulatory paradigm where regulators allow regulated firms to design the
regulatory systems).
235.

See, e.g., FIN. INDUS. REGUL. AUTH., INC., supra note 49, at RULE 3110(b)(4)

(requiring communications monitoring).
236.

See generally KPMG, INNOVATING COMPLIANCE THROUGH AUTOMATION 4 (2018)

(identifying compliance tasks to automate).
237.

See generally Nizan Geslevich Packin, Regtech, Compliance and Technology

Judgment Rule, 93 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 193, 206-10 (2018) (describing RegTech).
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Therefore, as a result of technology an alternative professional view of a
compliance practitioner may be developing, which is not squarely in either the
legal profession or organizational ethics. This is not surprising from a
professionalism perspective because technology has historically created new
jurisdictions for professions, or for new professions, to occupy, or has
eliminated those of existing professions. 238 Regulators have arguably been
indirectly advocating for this view of compliance because they are attracted by
the surveillance possibilities that RegTech opens for them. 2 3 9 That is, regulators
are mandated by law to oversee regulated firms, 24 0 and what better way to do
this than by themselves accessing the data within the firms? As regulators'
representatives, compliance officers would assist regulators in accessing all the
firm data that the regulator in question wants and needs. Compliance officers
would thus be tasked, among other things, with making sure that their
organization has up-to-date compliance technology and that this technology is
compatible with that used by the regulators-work that likely would demand
intellectual technology expertise. 241
This view of a compliance practitioner as a technology specialist who
assists in regulatory surveillance of organizations is at odds with the classic
picture of a professional who exercises judgment and discretion on behalf of
clients. It could certainly be contended that technology liberates compliance
practitioners from the drudgery and routine of certain compliance tasks, such as
reviewing communications and monitoring operations, and provides them time
to accomplish the higher-valued work of transforming the ethical culture of an
organization and dealing with the "hard" compliance cases. 24 2 However,
RegTech is inexorably automating and thus eliminating certain compliance
tasks, which means that firms are investing in it to save on the cost of

238. See ABBOTT, supra note 107, at 92 ("Today new technologies create potential
jurisdiction both rapidly and often."); id. ("Just as technology creates jurisdictions, so also it
destroys them.").
239. A good example of this is in FIN. INDUS. REGUL. AUTH., INC., TECHNOLOGY BASED
INNOVATIONS FOR REGULATORY COMPLIANCE ("REGTECH") IN THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY (2018)

(reporting on RegTech in the industry and explaining the benefits for broker-dealers of these
developments and technologies). Professor Kenneth Bamberger questions whether regulators overly
rely on the technology solutions of regulated firms, ratherthan designing them in conjunction with
the firms. See Bamberger, supra note 232, at 705.
240. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78s (2020) (SEC's oversight of self-regulatory organizations in
the securities industry).
241.

See,

e.g.,

PWC,

COMPLIANCE

ON THE FOREFRONT:

SETTING

THE PACE FOR

INNOVATION: 2019 STATE OF COMPLIANCE STUDY 11 (2019) (noting, on compliance hiring, "it is

imperative to focus on humans who are compliance process specialists and who have core,
integrated technology skill sets in such areas as data, analytics, and cyberrisk").
242. See Fanto, Dashboard Compliance, supra note 234, at 15-17 (discussing the increased
productivity made possible by technologically-enhanced or "dashboard" compliance).
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compliance by reducing the number of compliance officers. 24 3 Information
technology could transform compliance into a necessary and valuable, but
technical occupation in organizations with an increasing number of its tasks
being done by machines. The field would be shaped by regulators, particularly
as the latter's technological capabilities increase, with some oversight by the
legal profession through an organization's legal department because compliance
administers technical systems that apply the law and identify legal violations.
This is not a particularly positive professional outcome for compliance because
technical occupations are generally of a lower status and may even disappear
when the technology on which they are based is surpassed.
There is, of course, a more positive interpretation of these technological
developments in compliance that is more attractive to compliance practitioners
who want technology to enrich, not eliminate, their positions. Compliance
officers could become operations professionals with considerable technological
expertise (and some legal knowledge). They would fall within the orbit of fields
like computer engineering and data science, and possibly need a scientific
foundation and training. Rather than being technicians, they would be data
scientists with valued expertise and knowledge of data analytic systems, albeit
those applied to an organization's compliance. They could identify the
contributions and the limitations of technological solutions for senior
management and for regulators, which would be important in ensuring that
compliance achieves its public goals. 24 4 But however technology affects and
shapes the compliance occupation, even a positive view of its effect on
compliance complicates compliance officers' professional status and
contributes to their uncertain professional path.2 5

It is clear from the above that there are several reasons for compliance's
incomplete professional status, some stronger than others and several of them
reinforcing or resisting one other. The importance of compliance's professional
outcome and a prediction on what it might be are the subjects of the next Part.
IV. THE FUTURE OF COMPLIANCE AS A PROFESSION

The outcome of the professionalization of compliance is not just an
academic matter but has real world consequences. It deals with the functioning
of this important internal control function in organizations that is intended to
prevent and detect organizational misconduct. Because the resolution of

243. See id. at 16 (highlighting the possible loss of compliance officer positions due to
compliance technology).
244. See Bamberger, supra note 232, at 705-14 (identifying "perils" in compliance
technology that limit its effectiveness).
245. This uncertainty also arises from the fact that the technology used in compliance (e.g.,
data analytics) is changing so rapidly.
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compliance's professional status will influence its practice in organizations, it
may well affect the kind and level of this misconduct.
This Part first argues for having a strong compliance profession, distinct
and independent from other ones.
It contends that this kind of
professionalization would make compliance officers more effective in their
duties by preventing them from being completely subsumed within federal
It then
government or organizational bureaucracies and missions.
acknowledges that this ideal scenario is unlikely to come to pass, given the
strength of the reasons that have led to compliance's current uncertain
professional status. It thus argues that the most realistic professional strategy
for compliance is for compliance officers who are lawyers to become
recognized members of the legal profession and suggests a way for this to occur.
A. Compliance as a Strong and Independent Profession
This Section argues that compliance officers will be more effective in
organizations if they are members of a strong, independent profession, rather
than being subprofessionals operating at the periphery and under the authority
of the legal profession, deputies of a government agency, or technology
specialists. In the complex legal, ethical, and social environment in which
organizations function today, boards, executives, and employees need
compliance officers who understand well the organization's business and affairs
and the applicable legal, ethical, and other obligations applicable to them and
who can knowledgeably guide them in meeting those obligations. This function
of guidance and advice is critical in compliance because organizational actors
follow the direction of and consult with compliance officers when they are
performing everyday organizational tasks and are deciding on strategies and
courses of action in an organization's affairs. 24 6 The officers must have the
necessary knowledge and skills to provide this guidance and advice and the
independence and authority that encourages organizational actors to follow itall of which comes from being in a strong profession that has been granted the
control over its occupation by-at least in the United States-state government

licensing. 247
The legal profession, out of which compliance emerged, plainly
demonstrates the advantages when an internal control officer in an organization
is a member of a strong profession. Admittedly, inside legal counsel have not
always been synonymous with professional ideals and with independence from
organizations where they work. 24 8 However, that position, as well as the
conduct of many lawyers in it, does suggest how individuals who have a strong
professional identity can resist organizational pressures to go along with

246. See supratext accompanying note 70.
247. See FREIDSON, supra note 15, at 157-59 (discussing the epistemological authority of
professionals).
248. See Rosen, supra note 175, at 496 (discussing the influence of corporate power on
inside counsel professional position).
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problematic organizational strategies and decisions-in other words, can
influence, rather than be completely subject to, organizational control. 24 9 They
can also push organizations and organizational actors to have their conduct
follow guidelines (in this case laws and regulations, as well as non-legal
organizational aspirations) that may interfere with organizational goals. The
lawyers can achieve their organizational influence precisely because they are
not, and are not seen by others in the organization as being, entirely part of and
defined by the organization and are able to appeal to an extra-organizational
authority.25 0
Compliance officers would benefit by having a similarly strong
professional position as inside counsel that is based upon an authority and status
that come from outside the organization. The purpose of compliance is to
ensure that organizational actors conduct themselves in accordance with law,
regulation, an organization's code of ethics, and any other policies that it adopts,
all of which embrace goals that transcend organizational ones in the narrow
sense. 251 Compliance officers will have authority with organizational actors
regarding these "outside" purposes if they have a recognized status with respect
to these purposes. As compliance scholars recognize, 252 the officers cannot be
complete outsiders and must be well-integrated into the organization, because
they must understand how the organization works and how the laws,
regulations, and ethical standards can be translated into organizational policies
and procedures. But the officers cannot be entirely subsumed within the
organization's control and hierarchy because compliance would then be entirely
subject to the organization's preferences. 25 3
Compliance officers could have the requisite authority and status by being
the deputies of federal regulators and enforcement officials, a position that, as
discussed above, makes sense because the role of compliance officers has been
created by the federal government and because the officers are helping
regulators and enforcement officials perform an oversight role as to their
organization. 254 However, this kind of status would reduce the effectiveness of
compliance officers because they would be seen as being too close to these
government officials. In other words, executives and employees would be
reluctant to disclose all their plans, strategies and proposed decisions to
compliance officers out of fear that they would be rapidly communicated to

249. See id. at 501 (explaining that "legal service can be political. It can involve getting
clients to make decisions, influencing the goals they select and engaging them about the level at
which they will comply with the law.").
250. See id. at 524-25 (discussing the delicate exercise of professional judgment by inside
counsel in preventive law).
251. See supratext accompanying note 35.
252. See DeStefano, supra note 43, at 128-30 (discussing the problems associated with
compliance officers being seen as "outsiders").
253. See id. at 155 (emphasizing the need of compliance officers for autonomy and
independence).
254. See supratext accompanying notes 204-12.
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regulators and enforcement officials. 255
By contrast, professional status
removes compliance officers from government control and overreach even
though the officers serve public purposes in ensuring that the organization
complies with law and regulation. Compliance officers still have reporting and
other responsibilities to government officials, but such responsibilities are
compatible and even expected with professional status. But the status ensures
that they can exercise their discretion and judgment in performing their
compliance duties and enables them not to be entirely subservient to regulators
and enforcement officials, which independence would encourage executives
and employees to see the officers as separate from the officials and to seek out
their advice.
Compliance might best draw its authority and status by being a
stand-alone profession, rather than a subfield operating under the legal
profession. While there are benefits to being within the legal profession's orbit,
as will be discussed in the next Section, this alignment and subservience of
compliance to that profession both undermines the authority of compliance
officers and puts them, like organizational lawyers, in an adversarial position
with organizational actors.256 Rather, as explained earlier, the compliance
profession could be an entirely separate field with inspiration from
organizational studies, which better reflects its broad mandate to help
organizational actors comply with the law and other organizational standards
and to promote the organization's ethical culture. 257
This would give
compliance a nonlegal mission and therefore a distinct professional identity that
reflects its organizational function. 258
Professional status may also aid compliance officers in dealing with the
growing influence of technology on compliance that was discussed earlier.
Technological pressures can reinforce the organizational and government
efforts to subsume compliance officers into their bureaucratic control.
Professional status would give compliance officers more control over their work
so that they could resist being relegated by organizations to the level of lower
status technicians who could not question organizational goals and strategies
and so that they could have the discretion to limit their assistance to a regulator's
"high tech" surveillance of their organization. This status, however, is not
intended to stand completely in the way of technological developments that are
changing compliance practice, just as they affect other occupations. 25 9
255. See Langevoort, supra note 43, at 96-98 (discussing effects of zealous monitoring by
compliance officers).
256. But see DeStefano, supra note 43, at 123-24 (arguing that the standard view is that
compliance officers might report problems to the government that lawyers might keep confidential).
257. See supratext accompanying notes 217-20.
258. In addition, as a pragmatic matter, it might also address the concern of regulators and
enforcement officials that compliance officers, if too closely aligned with the legal profession, will
assert legal privileges when asked to report to them. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
259. On this transformation, see SUSSKIND & SUSSKIND, supra note 107, at 2-3 (setting
forth their broad argument on this point).
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Compliance will almost certainly retain a special relationship with technology,
but that does not mean that it has to become a lower-level technical occupation.
Compliance has the advantage of coming of age as a profession during an
intellectual technology "golden age" that could provide compliance officers
with the useful skills to make the collaboration between regulators and firms on
compliance systems more effective. 260 Compliance may thus conceivably
become a profession that serves as a model for demonstrating how technology
can be an integral part of the delivery of professional services.
The above suggests several ways in which compliance might best go
forward as a strong, independent profession. However, the next Section
explains how, as a real-world matter, the professionalization of compliance may
well proceed.
B. Compliance as a Recognized Partof the Legal Profession
Although it is interesting to speculate on the ideal professional outcome
for compliance, in reality the legal profession will continue to exert its authority
over this occupation. Therefore, there is a real possibility that compliance might
continue to operate at the periphery of the legal profession as a related,
somewhat technical occupation or "semi-profession," much in the way that
various medical occupations such as nursing function under the authority of
doctors. 2 1 The discussion in this Section explains why this outcome should be
avoided and how the professional position of compliance can be enhanced in
this "second best" scenario of its remaining connected to the law.
As discussed above, the ambivalent relationship between the legal
profession and compliance greatly contributes to compliance's uncertain
professional status. 26 2 The legal profession's occasional assertion of authority
over compliance is likely to continue. In fact, circumstances are pushing
compliance into that profession's sphere of influence. First, in many regulated
industries, such as finance and healthcare, compliance has an almost exclusively
legal orientation because law and regulation inform and shape the conduct of
nearly all the activities of a regulated firm and because the regulator oversees
the firm's compliance with them.263 This legal focus of compliance requires
that compliance officers possess considerable legal knowledge and training,
which has led to their recruitment from law schools or law programs. 264
Although compliance officers in these industries also focus on the ethical
culture of their organization, they generally have less time to devote to it, given

260. See Bamberger, supra note 232, at 730-34 (arguing for more transparency in firm
compliance technologies).
261. See FREIDSON, supra note 15, at 90 (discussing the role of nurses as "technicians" in a
subordinate position).
262. See supraSection I.A.
263.

See generally Fanto, Surveillantand Counselor, supra note 49, at 1130-43 (discussing

SEC and FINRA rules imposing compliance obligations on broker-dealers).
264. See Fanto, supra note 10, at 756-58; Pacella, supra note 71, at 953-58.
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the sheer-and ever growing-number of laws and regulations that they must
incorporate in policies and procedures for the organization's benefit; legal
compliance takes almost all of their attention and time. Indeed, as regulators
keep promulgating regulations and various kinds of regulatory guidance, they
can no longer assert with a straight face that they prefer compliance officers not
to be lawyers when, by their very actions, they are pushing compliance into the
legal profession's sphere of influence.
Although this "legalization" of compliance characterizes regulated
industries, these industries are significant in the economy. In addition, even
nonregulated organizations are subject to numerous laws and regulations.
Moreover, the governance and internal control of regulated firms often serve as
a model for other organizations, as mandated practices in the former get taken
up as "best practices" in the latter. 2 5 Thus, the focus on legal compliance and
the influence of the legal profession on compliance officers and programs are
likely to become more widespread.
Second, federal prosecutors and enforcement officials, who are generally
all lawyers, have considerable influence over compliance in all organizations,
even those that are not subject to special regulatory oversight. 266 As discussed
above, they evaluate the efficacy of organizations' compliance programs in their
decisions whether to prosecute organizations where serious legal violations
have occurred. 267 In their settlements with an organization, they often compel
the target organization to modify its compliance program to meet their
preferences. 268 Indeed, the U.S. Department of Justice even had a compliance
expert on its staff to assist in these evaluations and modifications. 269
Federal prosecutors and enforcement officials jealously guard this
influence over compliance and show no inclination to relinquish it.270 They
continue to formulate and to publicize their views on the elements of an
effective compliance program, which suggests that they believe that these
pronouncements should be authoritative. 271 The ethical culture of compliance

265. See James Fanto, Paternalistic Regulation of Public Company Management: Lessons
from Bank Regulation, 58 FLA. L. REV. 859 (2006) (arguing that bank regulation has become a

model for the regulation of public companies).
266. See supra text accompanying notes 55-63.
267.

See Arlen & Kahan, supra note 62.

268. See, e.g., Plea Agreement, United States v. Volkswagen AG, No. 16-CR-20394, (E.D.
Mich. Jan. 11, 2017) (including compliance monitor and specifications for the same).
269. See Chen & Soltes, supra note 63.
270.

See Todd Haugh, The Criminalization of Compliance, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1215,

1239 (2017) (describing prosecutors as "super-regulators" through their power over compliance in
organizations).
271. Indeed, the American Law Institute project on compliance has a chapter devoted to
enforcement that, among other things, offers principles to guide enforcement officials in their
evaluation of compliance programs. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW:
MANAGEMENT, AND ENFORCEMENT, supra note 90, at Chapter VI.
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in organizations no doubt matters to prosecutors and enforcement officials. 27 2
However, their main focus in either guidelines or settlements with respect to
compliance programs is on legal compliance because they are pushing
organizations to establish or to reform a compliance program to ensure that the
legal violations do not occur or recur. The effect of this prosecutorial and
enforcement activity is to reinforce in all organizations the connection between
compliance and the law, and thus the influence of the legal profession on
compliance.
Third, the ideal theoretical foundation for the compliance profession may
be organizational studies, as discussed above. 273 Yet compliance is unlikely to
become a managerial field given the pressures on organizations to demonstrate
legal compliance. Moreover, the managerial field has not been professionalized
in a strong way (i.e., in the sense of having state licensing regimes), perhaps
because it is closely associated with executive positions in organizations that
ultimately follow their own organizational purposes and logic. 27 4 Therefore,
making compliance a managerial discipline pushes it along a path that is weaker
for professional recognition.
For similar reasons (i.e., legalization of
compliance), it is unlikely that compliance can become a primarily
technological field.
Fourth, a social status story also supports the continued, and even growing,
influence of the legal profession on compliance. 275 As more lawyers enter the
compliance field, like inside counsel from a previous time, they may advocate
that they be recognized as an important part of the legal profession for which
they were trained. 276 Clearly aligning themselves with that established
profession may be the only way for compliance officers to attain an
organizational position equivalent to inside counsel and the benefits resulting
from a strong professional identity-particularly state government-sanctioned
control over their occupation. Moreover, the inside counsel position has to be
socially attractive to compliance practitioners because it combines recognized
authority within an organization with extra-organization status.
Therefore, for these reasons the legal profession will continue to exert its
authority over compliance. But this means that the compliance field risks
remaining without full professional status or, as appears to be happening, will
become a sub-profession under the legal profession's ultimate authority, more
akin to the subservient relationship of nursing to the medical profession. It also
272.

See, e.g., CRIM. Div., U.S. DEP'T OF

JUST.,

supra note 64, at 10 (stating that "it is

important for a company to create and foster a culture of ethics and compliance with the law...").
273. See supraSection IV.A.
274. As Abbott observes, "perhaps the reason that business administration has never
successfully managed to 'professionalize' is that it commonly recruits from other professions,
particularly law, accounting, and engineering." ABBOTT, supra note 107, at 132.
275. See LARSON, supra note 108, at 66-79 (describing professions as a social mobility
project).
276. See Rosen, supra note 175, at 490-502 (discussing the empowerment of inside
counsel).
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means that the negative consequences of this incomplete professional status will
continue, with no clear path to ameliorate or eliminate them. There would thus
be no professional bulwark to resist increasing federal government demands
upon compliance officers. Moreover, organizations could continue to structure
the compliance function-and make compliance officers work-according to
their organizational logic and technological demands, ratherthan compliance's
professional goals.
Given the legal profession's authority over compliance and the benefits of
compliance's professionalization weighed against the status quo, a strong
argument could be made that the legal profession should formally recognize
compliance as a legal practice while engaged in by members of the bar. This
recognition would formally bring lawyers working as compliance officers
inside the legal profession. This professional identification would shore up the
independence of these officers both with respect to the government and inside
their organization. On the basis of this clear, established professional identity,
compliance officers could more easily present themselves as providers of
professional advice and deserving of professional protection, which would
make it more difficult for the government to use them for its purposes. Having
compliance officers who are lawyers considered to be part of the legal
profession would also give them more control over their occupation in
organizations and thus not allow an organization itself to define their role and
place. It would also allow them more decision-making power with respect to
whether and how to use "RegTech" in their jobs.
As Professor Pacella has argued, it is not difficult to see compliance as a
kind of legal practice.2 7 7 Many compliance tasks involve applying the law to
given facts and circumstances in an organization, even if on a broad basis. After
all, compliance policies and procedures involve guiding in detail an
organization's operations and affairs so that they are conducted in accordance
with the laws and regulations applicable to an organization. Training in the
policies and procedures and monitoring the organization's employees and
agents for compliance with them are just derivative of this initial application of
the law. Advising boards, executives, and employees about the procedures and
policies and particularly helping them in situations that are not clearly within
the policies and procedures could be construed as providing legal advice. Here
the compliance officer applies the law to a specific set of facts so as to guide
specific conduct or decision-making of an organizational actor. It could even
involve an action that is clearly legal as drafting a contract so as to ensure that
a counterparty with the organization complies with the law.
Yet how exactly compliance practice should fit within the formal
definition of legal practice is a more difficult question. Professor Pacella argues
that compliance clearly is-and the Model Rules of Professional Responsibility
should be formally clarified and modified to recognize it as-a "law-related

277.

See Pacella, supra note 71, at 965.
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service," rather than a "legal service." 278 An important attraction of her
argument is that, as a "law-related service," compliance could still be engaged
in, as it is now, by those who are not lawyers. If it were a legal service, it would
be part of legal practice and thus off limits to nonlawyers, which would disrupt
the current state of compliance. Professor Pacella explains that clarifying that
compliance is a law-related service could be achieved through modifications to
Model Rule 5.7 that would serve two purposes: (i) protect the lawyer acting as
a compliance officer from professional liability for not following professional
rules, and (ii) help the recipient of compliance services provided by the
lawyer-compliance officer understand the exact role of the lawyer in
compliance practice.279
Professor Pacella's argument is compelling because it tries to solve a
current problem, the uncertain position of a lawyer acting as a compliance
officer in an organization and thus engaging in actions that appear to fall within
the definition of legal practice. She is rightly pushing the American Bar
Association and state bar associations to address this problem and to clarify the
applicability of professional canons to a lawyer as compliance officer's
position. However, from the professionalism perspective argued here, her
solution-making compliance a law-related, but not a legal, service-would
contribute to the subordination of the compliance field outlined above. That is,
by making compliance law-related, rather than legal, she would maintain
compliance practice as a legal sub-profession and group it with other such
ancillary fields that are listed in the Model Rules whose practitioners assist
lawyers. 280 This approach keeps compliance practitioners in their weak
quasi-professional position, but has the advantage of reflecting compliance
practice today and being more accommodating to the many, non-legally trained
persons engaged in compliance. 2 1
An alternative would be for compliance to be a legal, not a law-related,
service and for a compliance officer, at least one who is a lawyer, to be in a

278. See id. at 968-69. She argues that the provision of compliance services plainly fits
within the ABA's Model Rule 5.7, which requires a lawyer to comply with the professional conduct
rules when he or she provides "law-related service" unless the lawyer takes "reasonable measures"
so that the person receiving the services knows that they are not legal services and that the
protections of the client-lawyer relationship do not exist. See id.
279. See id. at 970-72. Professor Pacella offers edits to Rule 5.7, as well as to its notes, that
make this clarification. See id. at 993-94.
280. See id. at 970 (citing the commentary to the Rule that lists such examples as "providing
title insurance, financial planning, accounting, trust services, real estate counseling, legislative
lobbying, economic analysis, social work, psychological counseling, tax preparation, and patent,
medical or environmental consulting.") (citing MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 5.7 cmt. 9 (AM.
BAR ASS'N 1983)).

281. This outcome means that compliance officers would continue to have lucrative
positions with high social status, even without a professional status, not unlike the position of
management consultants, some of whom are lawyers, in the consulting arms of large accounting
firms like Deloitte or PWC.
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position similar to a member of the legal staff of an organization's legal
department. As discussed above, this interpretation of compliance would be
primarily based on the legal interpretative and advisory nature of a compliance
officer's activities.212 This view of compliance as a legal service would have
significant consequences, both for the lawyer acting as a compliance officer and
for nonlawyers engaged in this field-which Professor Pacella recognizes and
which lead her to prefer her alternative. For example, a lawyer providing
compliance advice would have to follow the lawyer's professional conduct rules
and deal with issues of confidentiality and privilege in communications with his
or her organizational client, with all the complications that this raises in the
compliance setting. 283
Although there are exceptions to the attorney
confidentiality and the attorney-client privilege, they may not be broad enough
to cover the regular reporting and communications with regulators that are an
integral and expected part of the compliance role. 284 Moreover, making
compliance a legal service could mean that only lawyers could be compliance
officers because nonlawyers doing compliance would be engaging in the
unauthorized practice of law. 2 5 This could be seriously disruptive of the current
practice of compliance that includes many nonlawyers. However, this full
legalization of compliance is powerful from a professionalism perspective
because lawyers who are compliance officers would receive the status and
protection of the legal profession and because this would resolve their uncertain
professional position.
The resolution of compliance's relationship with the legal profession may
well have to await developments "on the ground" such as pressure from
compliance practitioners and public acknowledgement of their need for
professional status, as it often does in the history of professions. 28 6 That is, it
may be necessary to see if, as is likely, with the continued movement of lawyers
into compliance these lawyers demand professional recognition, as did inside
counsel before them. How a profession (the law) occupies an adjacent
jurisdiction (compliance) is not usually only or even a theoretical matter; the
theoretical justification may follow from the reality of compliance practice. My
point here is that this alignment of compliance with the legal profession seems
both inevitable and professionally desirable for the lawyers who are compliance

282. Professor Pacella acknowledges that this advisory role runs contrary to the
litigation-orientation of the definition of legal practice. See Pacella, supra note 71, at 965-68
(discussing state definitions of the practice of law that have this focus).
283. For example, when advising, trainingor monitoring employees, the lawyer-compliance
officer might well have to warn them-as would inside counsel-that he or she does not represent
them, but the organization.
284. See Pacella, supra note 71, at 960-62 (discussing exceptions to Model Rules 1.6 and
1.13 dealing with reporting crime or fraud that will result in a substantial injury to others).
285. Under this interpretation, a nonlawyer doing compliance would fall afoul of Model
Rule 5.5 that prohibits the unauthorized practice of the law.
286. See ABBOTT, supra note 107, at 59-67 (discussing the contradictions in the emergence
of a profession from others).
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officers. If that is the case, care must be taken as to how the legal profession
ultimately defines compliance in its own canons and rules so that compliance
does not remain at its periphery in a subordinate position, with the negative
effects discussed above. 287
This recommended approach of having compliance either under the
authority of (i.e., law-related services) or squarely part of (i.e., legal services)
the legal profession will likely not be a desired professional outcome outside
the United States, where compliance is not as "law centric" as here, where other
professional identities for compliance have been offered, and where
professional status may depend upon national, not state or local, government
recognition. 288 However, this is not surprising because the specific professional
outcome for a given occupation is highly dependent upon geographical factors,
including the state's control of and interference in occupations generally. 289
Accordingly, that compliance remains a subfield (at worse) or becomes a
recognized part (at best) of the legal profession in the United States is both
descriptive and normative only for this context because compliance is
associated with a profession that has been so closely linked to that occupation
over the years and out of which it emerged.
CONCLUSION

This Article has examined the uncertain professional position of
compliance. Part II set the stage for this analysis by discussing how compliance
became an accepted and necessary internal control function within U.S.
organizations. It identified the nature of compliance and its origins in law and
regulation governing different industries. It also explained the accepted model
of compliance activities and compliance governance, emphasizing the position

of the CCO.
Part III discussed the ways in which the compliance occupation has
progressed along the path to achieving professional status. After setting forth
the key features of a profession, it examined how compliance satisfies this
professional model. It explained that compliance has many professional
features: it has become a recognized occupation, with certain knowledge and
skills that its practitioners must obtain and exhibit; institutions of higher
learning increasingly train aspiring compliance officers through courses of
study; and compliance practitioners have a group identity of engaging in a

287. Although, moreover, this is not necessarily an intellectually consistent position, to
address compliance officers who are not lawyers, legal canons could define lawyers doing
compliance as "legal," while allowing non-lawyers engaged in it to be seen as providing
"law-related" services. In time, it may be only lawyer-compliance officers who are actually
providing compliance advice that is legal advice in organizations.
288. See Parker et al., supra note 217, at 207 (on the basis of data from Australia, making
an argument for the non-legal compliance profession).
289. See ABBOTT, supra note 107, at 177-211 (discussing the "cultural environment" to
professions in multiple countries).

238

NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 35:1

common mission that is exemplified by their membership in professional
organizations and by their engaging in projects of codification and theorization
of their knowledge. The Part emphasized, however, that compliance does not
possess a defining feature of professional status, which is control over the
practice of compliance (i.e., a monopoly of practice), which in this country state
governments grant to a professional field, as exemplified by established
professions.
Part IV explored in more detail reasons for the incomplete professional
status of compliance. It argued that the most significant reason is the ambivalent
relationship between compliance and the established legal profession, where
from time to time, legal authorities and lawyers have asserted control over the
practice of compliance as if it were in their domain of influence but where at
other times they have been passive or complacent with respect to the oversight
of compliance practitioners, particularly those trained as lawyers. The Part
discussed the reasons for this ambivalence, including that the legal profession
has acceded to the wishes of organizations that need compliance but that desire
to have considerable control over its position in the organization. The Part then
identified another important reason for the incomplete professional status in that
the federal government through regulators and enforcement officials favors
compliance's weaker professional status because it can more easily enlist
compliance officers to serve its purposes. In other words, federal government
officials exploit the professional uncertainty of compliance to make compliance
officers their "eyes and ears" in the organization and draw them into its, rather
than the organization's, hierarchy.
The Part also examined two other reasons for the uncertain professional
status of compliance, inspiration from other disciplines and the influence of
technology in compliance. It explained how organizational and management
studies challenge the legal orientation of compliance and claim that it should be
under their theoretical guidance to enhance its effectiveness. The Part discussed
the basis for their contention, particularly that effective compliance is grounded
in organizational ethics and culture that these disciplines study. The Part also
considered the disruptive influence of technology upon compliance, which is
coming of professional age right when technology is transforming its activities.
It explained how compliance officers use technology to assist them in their
tasks; organizations want this use to save on compliance costs; and federal
regulators desire it because it may provide them with more access to information
inside organizations. The Part discussed how technology questions the future
role of compliance, as it automates and eliminates certain compliance tasks,
pushing compliance in the direction of a technical occupation.
Part V argued that the outcome of compliance's professional story matters
for organizational conduct. It contended that having a strong professional
identity will give compliance officers the independence and authority in
organizations that would enable them to guide and advise organizational actors
on how to conduct their activities in accordance with law, regulation and ethics.
It argued that this function of guidance and advice is critical in compliance
because it represents compliance officers being brought in as trusted partners

2021]

THE PROFSSIONAL.IZATION OF COM/PLTANCE

239

when organizational actors are considering courses of action. It explained how
compliance practitioners might best draw their authority and status by being
members of a stand-alone profession, rather than a subfield operating under the
legal profession, and that this profession could draw inspiration from
organizational studies, which better reflects its broad mandate to help
organizational actors comply with the law and other organizational standards
and to promote the organization's ethical culture.
The Part concluded by explaining why in the real world the legal
profession will continue to exert its authority over compliance and, as a result,
the compliance field risks remaining without professional status or, as appears
to be happening, becoming a subprofession under the legal profession's ultimate
authority. It argued that, given the legal profession's continuing authority over
compliance and the benefits of compliance's professionalization weighed
against the status quo, the legal profession should formally recognize
compliance as a kind of legal practice while engaged in by members of the bar.
It explained how this recognition would formally bring lawyers working as
compliance officers inside the legal profession and how this professional
identification would shore up the independence of these officers both with
respect to the government and inside their organization. It explored how this
professionalism alternative might work but acknowledged that it must await
developments in compliance and pressure from compliance officers themselves.
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